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I.

INTRODUCTION

Prompt and affordable access to essential medicines is a
component of almost all domestic and global public health
models. As is now well known, the availability and costs of both
brand and generic drugs are a function of traditional patent
law incentives. Less known, however, is that generic entry is
controlled increasingly through an emerging form of global
intellectual property law referred to as “linkage regulations.”
Linkage regulations tie generic drug approval and, thus, access
to essential medications to existing drug patents through
potentially long and costly litigation. The linkage regime is in
the process of rapidly spreading worldwide through
international free trade agreements. Even so, very little is
known about how the regulations work in developed nations let
alone how they impact public health systems across
international borders. The authors constitute a network of
eleven health policy experts and practicing lawyers in nine
countries including those with mature linkage regulations,
those with new regulations, those without regulations but with
practices that parallel linkage, and those where regulations are
currently subject to intense public debate and litigation.
The study of structure-function relationships in living
systems, both at the micro and macro levels, has served science
especially well over the last century. The term “structurefunction” refers to the relationship between the structural and
functional elements of a system. As demonstrated by
pioneering work in general systems theory and systems biology
over the last half century, the interaction between structural
and functional elements in a given system is bi-directional; not
only does structure influence function, but function also
influences structure. The structure-function paradigm applies
fundamentally to law in two ways. First, governments have
specific legal and policy goals and these goals are expressed in
the form of statutes and regulations. Second, these policy goals
are reviewed by courts in judicial and are often revisited by
governments in the context of their law reform efforts.

01 BOUCHARD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

8/1/2011 1:37 PM

STRUCTURE-FUNCTION

393

Here, we propose a novel structure-function framework to
conduct a comparative legal analysis of global pharmaceutical
linkage, with the aim of obtaining critical information about
the costs and benefits of tying pharmaceutical innovation and
generic drug availability to drug patenting. A major goal of the
research is to investigate the structural and functional aspects
of global linkage regulations as they relate to drug availability,
costs, and expenditures on the one hand and incentives for
innovation and protection of rights on the other. Nations and
economic regions analyzed include the United States, Canada,
Mexico, Australia, India, China, South Korea, and the
European Union. The structural and functional aspects we
discuss here include: assessment in each jurisdiction of the
original policy intent underpinning linkage; the manner in
which public health policy and economic policy are perceived by
governments and the courts to converge or diverge through
linkage; the specific legal checks and balances designed
specifically to maintain balance between the interests of brand
and generic firms; the growing expansion of linkage beyond the
drug approval-drug patenting nexus to encompass drug pricing
and reimbursement; and the role of empirical studies to
establish the legal legitimacy of linkage regulations. A second
goal of our work is to assist domestic and global governments
and legal systems working with linkage regimes to balance the
production of new and innovative drugs with timely generic
entry and, thus, to lower public health costs and increase
access to essential medicines.
II. EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL
LINKAGE
Access to essential medicines is a significant component of
most models of domestic and global public health and is central
to the goal of ensuring value for money regarding drug costs
and expenditures. The availability and costs of new and generic
drugs is a function of traditional patent law incentives and
emerging linkage regulations.1 Patent law is a well described,2
1. See Ron A. Bouchard, Living Separate and Apart is Never Easy:
Inventive Capacity of the PHOSITA as the Tie That Binds Obviousness and
Inventiveness, 4 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1, 53–55 (2007).
2. See generally KENNETH ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE AND THE
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR INNOVATION, reprinted in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609–24
(Richard Nelson ed., 1962) (explaining the economic roles of information and
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if controversial,3 policy lever for stimulating drug
development.4 Linkage regulations tie generic drug availability
to existing drug patents by connecting approval to the
resolution of patent validity or infringement.5 This can result in
innovation); DAVID VAVER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: CRITICAL
CONCEPTS IN LAW (2006) (providing an overview of all aspects of patent law);
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1595–1629 (2003) (outlining the ways in which patent law varies and its
different theoretical approaches); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844–68 (1990)
(explaining various patent law doctrines). For an account of the relationship
between patents and drug discovery, development, and marketing from the
earliest days of the industry to the present, see GRAHAM DUTFIELD,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE SCIENCE INDUSTRIES: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 157–82 (2d ed. 2009).
3. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 3, 11–28
(2008); MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY 68–91, 149–80 (2008) [hereinafter BOLDRIN & LEVINE,
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY]; SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE
INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? 1–
3 (2003); Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Economics of Ideas and
Intellectual Property, 102 PNAS 1252, 1256 (2005); Adam Jaffe, The U.S.
Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation Process, 29
RES. POL’Y 531, 531–32 (2000); Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The
Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current
Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273, 274–75 (1998); Keith Pavitt, National Policies for
Technical Change: Where are the Increasing Returns to Economic Research?,
93 PNAS 12,693, 12,694–95 (1996).
4. Ron A. Bouchard, KSR v. Teleflex Part 1: Impact of U.S. Supreme
Court Patent Law on Canadian Intellectual Property and Regulatory Rights
Landscape, 15 HEALTH L.J. 221, 239–40 (2008) [hereinafter Bouchard, KSR v.
Teleflex Part 1]; Bouchard, supra note 1, at 23; Ron A. Bouchard, Should
Scientific Research in the Lead-Up to Invention Vitiate Obviousness Under the
Patented Medicines (Notice Of Compliance) Regulations: To Test or Not to
Test?, 6 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2007); Thomas A Faunce & Joel Lexchin,
‘Linkage’ Pharmaceutical Evergreening in Canada and Australia, AUSTL. &
N.Z.
HEALTH
POL’Y,
June
1,
2007,
available
at
http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/1/8; Paul Jones, KSR and the
Supreme Court: The silence is deafening, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 849, 852 (2008).
5. Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/1993133 (Can.). For a review of Canadian linkage regulations, see Ron A.
Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby: Canada’s Continuing Support of U.S. Linkage
Regulations for Pharmaceuticals, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 71, 73
(2010) [hereinafter Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby]; Edward Hore, A
Comparison of United States and Canadian Laws as They Affect Generic
Pharmaceutical Market Entry, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373, 384–87 (2000); Joel
Lexchin, After Compulsory Licensing: Coming Issues in Canadian
Pharmaceutical Policy and Politics, 40 HEALTH POL’Y 69, 70–71 (1997).
Linkage can be referred to as that between generic drug safety, quality, and
efficacy approval to the assessment of potential patent infringement. See
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long and costly litigation, the costs of which are ultimately
borne by consumers.6
The patent system has been in operation for over 500
years, with early patent laws in Italy and the United
Kingdom.7 By contrast, the linkage regime has only been in
existence for about twenty-five years following passage of the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,
(Hatch-Waxman Act) in the United States in 19848 and the
Canadian Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations (NOC Regulations).9 In both originating
jurisdictions, the linkage regime was brought in explicitly to
balance the competing policy goals of stimulating the

Thomas Faunce, Global Intellectual Property Protection for Innovative
Pharmaceuticals: Challenges for Bioethics and Health Law, in GLOBALIZATION
AND HEALTH: CHALLENGES FOR HEALTH LAW AND BIOETHICS 87, 91 (Belinda
Bennett
&
George
F.
Tomossy
eds.,
2006),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1409211. For the sake of
simplicity, the term “linkage” is used in this article to refer to the nexus
between drug approval and drug patenting.
6. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY, supra note 3, at
73–82; Jean O. Lanjouw & William Jack, Trading Up: How Much Should Poor
Countries Pay to Support Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 4 CENTER FOR GLOBAL
DEV. BRIEF 1, 1–2 (2004).
7. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY, supra note 3, at
212–242; DUTFIELD, supra note 2.
8. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (HatchWaxman), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355 (2000)). For a description of U.S. linkage laws, see Jeremy Bulow, The
Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents, in 4 INNOVATION POL’Y & THE ECON. 145,
147–51 (2004), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10802.pdf; Andrew
A. Caffrey, III & Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents and
Procedure: Generic Drug Market Entry and the Need to Reform the HatchWaxman Act, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4–7 (2004); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents,
Product Exclusivity, and Information Dissemination: How Law Directs
Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 482–
86 (2003); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its
Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 189–92
(1999); Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by
Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 171, 174–78 (2008); Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik,
Navigating the Anticommons for Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady the Course
on Hatch-Waxman 1–14 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 209,
2004).
9. See Christopher Scott Harrison, Protection of Pharmaceuticals as
Foreign Policy: The Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement and Bill C-22 Versus the
North American Free Trade Agreement and Bill C-91, 26 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 457, 521–25 (2001); Hore, supra note 5, at 381–87; Robert S.
Tancer, Foreign Investment in North America and the Pharmaceutical
Industry in Canada, 39 THE INT’L EXECUTIVE 283, 293 (1997).
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development of new and innovative drugs and facilitating the
timely entry of generic drugs.10 Compared to the patent system,
the linkage regime therefore represents a novel and emerging
intellectual property paradigm for protecting pharmaceutical
inventions. Given the comparative youth of the pharmaceutical
linkage regime, it is not surprising that empirical data is only
now beginning to be reported on the impact of linking drug
approval to drug patenting on the twin policy goals of
encouraging the development of new drugs and the timely
entry of generic competitors. This includes earlier qualitative
studies of gaming the automatic stay and other provisions in
the originating American and Canadian linkage regimes,11 as
well as newer quantitative empirical studies of the performance
and outputs of both systems over time.12
Of growing interest from a global public health perspective,
pharmaceutical linkage is no longer restricted to the North
American context or solely to the drug approval-drug patenting
nexus. Indeed, in 2011 we are witnessing the rapid spread of
the linkage regime on a global level including to developing
countries where access to generics is both of more significance
and more problematic.13 This is due to a growing number of
10. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 108; Avery, supra note
8, at 175.
11. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY, at i–xi (July 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf; see also Caffrey & Rotter,
supra note 8, at 35–37. See generally Bulow, supra note 8; Epstein and Kuhlik,
supra note 8; Avery, supra note 8.
12. Ron A. Bouchard et al., Empirical Analysis of Drug Approval-Drug
Patenting Linkage for High Value Pharmaceuticals, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 174, 174, 192–217 (2010) [hereinafter Bouchard et al., Drug ApprovalDrug Patenting]; Ron A. Bouchard et al., The Pas de Deux of Pharmaceutical
Regulation and Innovation: Who’s Leading Whom?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1461, 1486–1507 (2009) [hereinafter Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom?];
Monika Sawicka & Ron A. Bouchard, Empirical Analysis of Drug Approval
Data 2001-2008: Are Canadian Pharmaceutical Players “Doing More With
Less”?, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 85, 88–104 (2009).
13. See Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 89 fig.5; C. Scott
Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives
and the Hatch-Waxman Act (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working
Paper No. 405, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 391, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1736822; C.
Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When do Generics Challenge Drug
Patents? 24–27 (The Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies at Columbia Univ. Sch. of
Law,
Working
Paper
No.
379,
2011),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640512 (noting the impact of the Hatch-Waxman act
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multilateral and bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
involving the United States.14 Recent agreements include
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS),15 as well as narrower agreements between the United
States, Canada and Mexico,16 Australia,17 and Korea,18 among
others.19 The latter agreements require participating nations to
incorporate linkage and other intellectual property provisions
in their patent systems in exchange for preferential trade
terms20 and are increasingly negotiated outside the purview of
the World Trade Organization (WTO). As these provisions
provide stronger intellectual property protection for drugs than
provided for by TRIPS, they are referred to as “TRIPS-Plus.”21
The European Commission (E.C.) Pharmaceutical Inquiry
recently reported several instances where member nations
have attempted to institute pharmaceutical linkage regimes
even though European Union law prohibits linkage.22
on drug patenting).
14. Carlos María Correa, Bilateral Free Trade Agreements and Access to
Medicines, 84 BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 399, 399 (2006); Judit Rius
Sanjuan, Patent-Registration Linkage, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHN. (Apr. 3,
2006),
http://www.cptech.org/publications/CPTechDPNo2Linkage.pdf;
Overview on Patent Linkage, FINSTON CONSULTING, 1–2 (Aug. 7, 2006),
http://www.finstonconsulting.com/version03/files/Overview.pdf.
15. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 186 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (negotiated as part of the
Uruguay Round (1986–1994) of the World Trade Organization’s General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)).
16. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605.
17. U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, 118
Stat. 919, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/australian-fta/final-text.
18. Free Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Republic of Korea, U.S.–S. Kor., June 30, 2007 [hereinafter KorUS FTA],
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/korus-fta/final-text. The agreement between the United States
and Korea is still pending ratification. See Prospects for Implementing the
Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., 1 (October
2010), http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb10-23.pdf.
19. Correa, supra note 14, at 401.
20. Faunce, supra note 5, at 93–101; Thomas Faunce & Kathy Shats,
Bilateral Trade Agreements as Drivers of National and Transnational Benefit
from Health Technology Policy: Implications of Recent US Deals for Australian
Negotiations with China and India, 62 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 196, 202–07, 209
(2008).
21. Correa, supra note 14, at 399.
22. Dir. Gen. for Competition, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Final
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The implications of pharmaceutical linkage to global public
health are great. For example, recent work has shown that the
linkage regime can extend cumulative patent terms for high
value pharmaceuticals by as much as two-fold beyond that
provided by the basic patent covering the compound.23 This is
consistent with early predictions of the impact of linkage on
market exclusivity by Schondelmeyer,24 based on experience
with the U.S. linkage regime.25 An additional concern is that
the extension of market exclusivity on brand drugs (and thus
prolonged monopoly pricing) occurs even though fifty to
seventy-five percent of patents challenged may be invalid or not
infringed by the generic equivalent.26 Moreover, the scope of
settlements between brand-name firms and generic firms
under linkage not only renders consumers and other payers
worse off than if generics were to win litigation on the merits,
but it is possible that settlements of this nature may be
Report, at 23, SEC (2009) 952 final (July 7, 2009) [hereinafter Final Report],
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working
_paper_part1.pdf. This theme is developed extensively in the Preliminary
Report. Dir. Gen. for Competition, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary
Report, 15, 113, 261 (Nov. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Preliminary Report], available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary_r
eport.pdf.
23. See Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom?, supra note 12 at 1498.
24. Dr. Stephen Schondelmeyer, a pharmacologist and health economist,
gave evidence before the House of Commons to the effect that it is not the term
of single patents that mattered most, but rather how patents add cumulatively
to extend market exclusivity, a claim the government at the time vigorously
denied. See Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 74 n.6.
25. Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights:
Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far? 41 IDEA 227, 233 n. 27
(2001) (citing The Gale Group, Intellectual Property Rules: A Delicate
Balancing Act for Drug Development, 23 CHAIN DRUG REV. RX13 (2001),
available
at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3007/is_4_23/ai_n28824986/?tag=conten
t;col1).
HORE,
PATENTLY
ABSURD:
EVERGREENING
OF
26. EDWARD
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION UNDER THE PATENTED MEDICINES
(NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE) REGULATIONS OF CANADA’S PATENT ACT 11 (2004)
[hereinafter
HORE,
PATENTLY
ABSURD],
available
at
http://www.canadiangenerics.ca/en/news/docs/patently_absurd_04.pdf;
FED.
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 11, at vii–viii; Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 8, at 40
n. 293. It should be noted, however, that this data is now somewhat old and
requires updating for both the United States and Canada following
amendments to the respective linkage regimes over the last half decade.
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necessary in the long run for ‘generics to be adequately
compensated for the risk of taking escalating litigation created
by linkage laws. This creates a conflicting system in which
governments with linkage regimes that limit the timely
appearance of generics also depend on these firms to produce
cost savings and limit the growth in pharmaceutical
expenditures. A related issue is that costs of prolonged
litigation are passed on to consumers,27 with differential costs
to governments and the public in accordance with their system
of drug reimbursement,28 public health,29 public-private
discourse,30 and health equity.31
Considerations such as the forgoing must be balanced
against the widely accepted need for innovative drugs in
developed and developing nations; the presumption of patent
validity in nations with established patent legislation; and the

27. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY, supra note 3, at
73–77; Bulow, supra note 8, at 162–63.
28. EXPLORING SOCIAL INSURANCE: CAN A DOSE OF EUROPE CURE
CANADIAN HEALTH CARE FINANCE? 2–3 (Colleen M. Flood et al. eds., 2008).
29. See generally MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG
COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT xiii–xv (2004)
(describing drug development preferences for follow-on drugs, drug
evergreening practices and the high costs of prescription drugs in America);
JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 183, 196–97 (2004) (detailing the impacts health care
systems have on its patients and the role of follow-on drugs in dominating
drug development); JAY S. COHEN, OVERDOSE: THE CASE AGAINST THE DRUG
COMPANIES 176–94 (2001) (summarizing problems associated with the FDA,
how this relates to drug development preferences and how these problems
affect the public); PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA,
BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION xii–xvi (2003)
(describing the history of the Food and Drug Administration and associated
shifts in drug development preferences); RAY MOYNIHAN & ALAN CASSELS,
SELLING SICKNESS: HOW THE WORLD’S BIGGEST PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES
ARE TURNING US ALL INTO PATIENTS xviii (2005) (noting that there is much
debate surrounding the ways in which drug companies have become profitable
and the relation of profit to follow-on drugs).
30. See Mary E. Wiktorowicz, Emergent Patterns in the Regulation of
Pharmaceuticals: Institutions and Interests in the United States, Canada,
Britain, and France, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 615, 616, 620–21 (2003).
31. See Trudo Lemmens, Leopards in the Temple: Restoring Scientific
Integrity to the Commercialized Research Scene, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 641,
647–52 (2004); Trudo Lemmens, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Secrecy about
Clinical Trials, 34 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14, 15–16 (2004); Kevin Outterson,
Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International
Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 193–96
(2005); Kevin Outterson, Should Access to Medicines and TRIPS Flexibilities
Be Limited to Specific Diseases, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 279, 279–80 (2008).
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idea in law that if the state grants a party an exclusive legal
right, it cannot turn around and grant another party
permission to encroach upon that right without just cause.32
A related observation is that while the concept of
pharmaceutical linkage is new compared to the patent system,
there is already significant pressure to broaden it beyond drug
approval to include linkage between patent rights and other
regulatory aspects of drug approval and marketing.33 An
expansive concept of linkage would differ significantly from the
relatively discrete legal nexus between drug patents and
marketed products envisioned by the architects of linkage in
the United States and Canada.34 For example, the E.C.
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry35 recently articulated a broad
definition of pharmaceutical linkage, including linkage of
patent status to formal legal proceedings between parties;
patent settlements; as well as a wide range of interventions
before national drug regulators, including those relating to

32. Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s
Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 57–58 (2008).
33. See e.g., Final Report, supra note 22, at 130; Preliminary Report,
supra note 22, at 15.
34. See HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD, supra note 26, at 5; Bouchard, I’m Still
Your Baby, supra note 5, at 138–39; Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 8, at 4–7.
For elaboration, see also discussion infra Part IV.A.
35. Final Report, supra note 22, at 480 (“The Commission will continue to
strictly enforce the applicable Community law and, for instance, act against
patent linkage, as according to Community legislation, marketing
authorisation bodies cannot take the patent status of the originator medicine
into account when deciding on marketing authorisations of generic
medicines.”). In the Preliminary Report, the E.C. stated more specifically that
patent-linkage is considered unlawful under Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004
and Directive (EC) No. 2001/83. Preliminary Report, supra note 22, at 14.
Further elaboration is provided to the effect that
Patent linkage refers to the practice of linking the granting of MA,
the pricing and reimbursement status or any regulatory approval for
a generic medicinal product, to the status of a patent (application) for
the originator reference product. Under EU law, it is not allowed to
link marketing authorisation to the patent status of the originator
reference product. Article 81 of the Regulation and Article 126 of the
Directive provide that authorisation to market a medicinal product
shall not be refused, suspended or revoked except on the grounds set
out in the Regulation and the Directive. Since the status of a patent
(application) is not included in the grounds set out in the Regulation
and in the Directive, it cannot be used as an argument for refusing,
suspending or revoking MA.
Final Report, supra note 22, at 130 (citations omitted).
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market approval, drug pricing, and reimbursement.36
Moreover, a growing number of legal disputes have been
reported whereby countries without linkage have attempted to
import or export drugs. In some instances, the drug shipments
are seized by other nations who allege that the shipments are
in violation of domestic patent laws linked to international
trade instruments such as TRIPS or other FTAs.37
An evolving landscape such as that reviewed thus far
raises the question of whether the pharmaceutical industry is
using linkage as an emerging stepping-stone in its efforts to
reach across global borders to establish a uniform intellectual
property regime in a distinctly non-uniform world. In this way,
linkage regulations in respect of therapeutic products, have
quietly emerged as a powerful driver of drug regulation, access
to essential medication, and public health costs on the global
stage.
III. METHODOLOGY & RESEARCH QUESTIONS
When the group began its work, the obvious question to
ask was, what should the focus be of future research on
pharmaceutical linkage as it evolves over time from its North
American roots? We noted with interest that the study of
structure-function relationships in living systems, both at the
micro and macro levels, has served the life sciences especially
well over the last century. Structure-function analyses in the
life sciences have led to numerous key insights into molecular,
cellular, tissue, organ, and whole body functioning over the last
half-century. For example, structure-function studies have
36. In the Preliminary Report, the E.C. noted that
Interventions before regulatory bodies (marketing authorisation
authorities and pricing and reimbursement bodies) appear to be a
standard tool in originator companies’ toolbox. Although contacting
the health authorities may address legitimate concerns, it can also be
used to delay or block the marketing authorisation or the pricing or
reimbursement status of the generic product. In particular, by
suggesting that the generic product is less efficient or safe or is not
equivalent, raising patent infringement issues concerning the generic
product in question and alleging that any decision favourable to the
generic company would make the authorities liable to patent
infringement damages (patent linkage), originator companies gain
time and can create delays in granting marketing approval for the
generic product and its entry into the market.
Preliminary Report, supra note 22, at 314.
37. See, e.g., WTO Dispute over Seized Drug Shipment, PHARMALETTER
(Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.thepharmaletter.com/file/91762/wto-dispute-overseized-drug-shipment.html.
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yielded detailed descriptions of drug, chemical and hormonal
receptors, cell membrane and intracellular constituents, second
messenger systems, chemical and hormonal mediation of intraorgan and inter-organ function. More recently, functional
imaging techniques have revealed a remarkable degree of brain
plasticity in the context of congenital and acquired disease
states, including under circumstances where dysfunction was
previously thought to be permanent.
As demonstrated by pioneering work in general systems
theory and systems biology over the last half century, the
interaction between structural and functional elements in a
system is bi-directional; that is, not only does structure
influence function, but function also influences structure. As
discussed further below, this occurs through various feedback
mechanisms. The structure-function paradigm applies
fundamentally to law in two ways. First, because governments
have specific legal and policy goals in mind when drafting law
and regulations, and these goals are expressed in the form of
discrete legal and regulatory language. Second because policy
goals and statutory language employed by governments and
administrative bodies are reviewable by the courts in judicial
review and other proceedings and are often revisited by
governments in the context of their law reform efforts.
The rapid spread of pharmaceutical linkage worldwide
offers a unique and time sensitive opportunity to carry out
empirical work on the system as it evolves globally, from its
original locus in North America. A major goal of our work on
global pharmaceutical linkage is to investigate the structural
and functional aspects of different systems of linkage
regulations and their relationship to drug availability costs and
expenditures, balanced with incentives for innovation and
protection of intellectual property rights.
As in other complex political, legal and economic systems,38
the pharmaceutical linkage network is assumed to have
38. ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS: COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL LIFE 260 (1997); Ravi Bhavnani, Agent Based Models in the Study of
Ethnic Norms and Violence, in COMPLEXITY IN WORLD POLITICS: CONCEPTS
AND METHODS OF A NEW PARADIGM 121, 127 (Neil E. Harrison ed., 2006);
Barry Bozeman, Public-Value Failure: When Efficient Markets May Not Do, 63
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 145, 154 (2002); Barry Bozeman & Daniel Sarewitz, Public
Values and Public Failure in US Science Policy, 32 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 127
(2005); John D. Sterman, All Models Are Wrong: Reflections on Becoming a
Systems Scientist, 18 SYS. DYNAMICS REV. 501, 524–26 (2002).
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structural and functional characteristics that can be identified
and measured. These quantified characteristics, can then, in
turn, serve as appropriate benchmarks to assess the
performance of the system relative to its goals and objectives.
Key decision makers, including brand and generic
pharmaceutical firms, the courts, patent counsel, consumers,
payers, and other actors, are assumed to interact in domestic
and global networks through reasonably well-defined channels
of communication.39 Complex systems are characterized by
broad rules that have increasing applicability and universality
as the symmetry and elegance of the rules increase.40 Indeed,
previous work has demonstrated that this principle applies to
innovation ecologies regulated by law,41 particularly those where
large-scale public and private rights revolving around technology
must be balanced.42
We use the term “structural” in this Article to refer to the
broad administrative, legal, and policy attributes of the linkage
regime in differing jurisdictions. Together, these attributes
form the initial starting conditions for operation of linkage
regimes. The initial starting conditions, as in dynamical
physical systems, represent the sum of the political, economic,
and public policy conditions that together form the “take-off”
point for a new law and the conditions in which this law begins
to operate.43 The structural aspect also encompasses the

39. See generally Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical
Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401, 423–24 (2004)
(describing the concept of “nodal governance” and its relation to general
systems theories).
40. See generally MURRAY GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND THE JAGUAR:
ADVENTURES IN THE SIMPLE AND THE COMPLEX 370–71 (1994). The practical
implications of elegance and symmetry in physics and mathematics are
explored elegantly by Gell-Mann in a videocast on the subject. See Murray
Gell-Mann, Beauty and Truth in Physics: Murray Gell-Mann on TED.com,
TED BLOG (Dec. 6, 2007), http://blog.ted.com/2007/12/murray_gellmann.php.
41. See Fred Gault & Sasanne Huttner, Commentary, A Cat’s Cradle for
Policy, 455 NATURE 462 (2008); David H. Guston, Commentary, Innovation
Policy: Not Just Jumbo Shrimp, 454 NATURE 940, (2008); William Wulf,
Editorial, Changes in Innovation Ecology, 316 SCI. 1253 (2007).
42. Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom?, supra note 12, at 1513–15;
Drahos, supra note 39; J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It
possible?, (2005) 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 21, 25–27 (2005) [hereinafter Ruhl
2005].
43. ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED: HOW EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED
TO EVERYTHING ELSE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS, SCIENCE, AND
EVERYDAY LIFE 93–107 (2003); JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW
SCIENCE 241–73 (1988); JOHN H. HOLLAND, ADAPTATION IN NATURAL AND
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specific legal mechanisms that drive operation of linkage
regimes in various jurisdictions. Identifying the structural
attributes and mechanisms of individual linkage systems is
important; as combined they provide the benchmark from
which to assess the successes and failures of local systems in
operation and their potential to combine to form a global and
integrated regulatory regime.
Our research thus far has identified a number of important
structural aspects of pharmaceutical linkage, including:
assessment in each jurisdiction of the original policy intent
underpinning the linkage regime; the manner in which public
health policy and economic policy is perceived by governments
and the courts to converge or diverge through the linkage
vector; the legal checks and balances found within the linkage
regime designed specifically to maintain balance between the
interests of brand and generic firms; the provisions in addition
to linkage that were included in enabling legislation; the
growing expansion of the linkage concept beyond the drug
approval-drug patenting nexus to encompass that between
patenting and international trade mechanisms; and how
pharmaceutical linkage is in the process of informing the
construction of new laws pertaining to follow-on biologics.
We use the term “functional” to refer to the outputs of the
regulations in each jurisdiction, as well as how these outputs
functionally interact across borders to operate as a coherent
global regulatory regime. The functional aspects reflect the
behavior of the system as it evolves with time away from the
initial starting conditions,44 in this case the U.S. HatchWaxman regime. The functional aspects we have identified to
ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS 6–9 (1992); JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW
ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY 60 (1992); cf. STEVEN JOHNSON,
EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE
104–10 (2001); STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH
FOR THE LAWS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY 75–82 (1995); see also
GREGOIRE NICOLIS & ILYA PRIGOGINE, EXPLORING COMPLEXITY: AN
INTRODUCTION (1989); M. MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING
SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER AND CHAOS (1992); W. Brian Arthur, Positive
Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92 (1990).
44. Harrison, supra note 9, at 491–95 (2001); see also LES JOHNSTON &
CLIFFORD SHEARING, GOVERNING SECURITY: EXPLORATIONS IN POLICING AND
JUSTICE 138–61 (2003); Scott Burris, Governance, Microgovernance, and
Health, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 335, 357 (2004); Clifford Shearing & Jennifer Wood,
Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New ‘Denizens’, 30 J.L. & SOC’Y 400,
401–06.
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study include: the impact of linkage regulations on the
development of new and innovative drugs; the manner in which
this is balanced by the timely entry of generic drugs; the degree
to which market exclusivity is or can be extended solely by
operation of the linkage regime; how brand firms use the
linkage system in order to extend market exclusivity on high
value drugs; the costs to consumers or other payers of extended
exclusivity; the costs of extended exclusivity based on patents
that are ultimately found to be invalid or not infringed; the
impact of differing mechanisms of regulatory oversight on drug
pricing and reimbursement; and the role of empirical studies
for the legitimacy of linkage regulations.
Complex legal, scientific, medical, and economic issues
such as those encompassed by the linkage regime lend
themselves well to study by a network, or consortium of
scholars and practicing lawyers.45 A unique advantage of a
network-based approach is that studying linkage in different
jurisdictions allows for both: (1) an investigation of the
structural and functional characteristics of local linkage
regimes with different initial starting conditions and different
legal mechanisms of operation; and (2) the identification of
general rules of linkage as the different national forms of
linkage interact and influence global pharmaceutical
regulation. The former provides a descriptive mechanism for
assessing the successes and failures of different regimes while
the latter provides a prescriptive approach for key decision
makers to revise, institute or abolish linkage regulations
according to the goals and objectives of differing nations.
The objective of our research is to produce and utilize
empirical knowledge relating to different linkage regimes as a
knowledge translation tool for assessing the strengths,
weaknesses, successes, and failures of pharmaceutical linkage
in individual nations and how they combine to form a global

45. The authors represent nations with mature linkage regulations
(United States, Canada), nascent regulations (Australia, China), those without
regulations but with certain practices that operate to parallel linkage (E.U.),
and those where both the existence and scope of linkage regulations are the
subject of intense public scrutiny (India, Mexico, South Korea). The analytical
framework presented in this Article was originally conceived as an application
for funding to the primary Canadian medical research funding agency, which
was not successful. However, the authors hope the work produced by the
consortium is of assistance to the global intellectual property bar and national
governments in their respective deliberations regarding pharmaceutical
linkage.
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system of pharmaceutical linkage. Different economic, public
health, and political systems present a different set of initial
starting conditions not only for the de novo operation of linkage
regulations in each jurisdiction as they come into force, but also
for how these systems evolve, grow, and adapt to changing
conditions over time. Indeed, our early data suggests
substantial differences between jurisdictions in this regard.
These differences may be fundamentally responsible for the
opposition of certain nations and economic regions to
pharmaceutical linkage, and the varying degrees of success of
those employing them with the twin policy goals of encouraging
the development of new and innovative drugs, while also
facilitating the timely entry of generic drugs and access to
essential medications.
IV. STRUCTURAL & FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF
PHARMACEUTICAL LINKAGE
A. ORIGINAL POLICY INTENT
An excellent starting point for a global analysis of
pharmaceutical linkage is the “original policy intent”
underpinning linkage in differing jurisdictions. Original policy
intent presents a critical issue for determination of whether or
not legislation is intra vires or ultra vires, as governments have
specific legal and policy goals in mind when drafting laws and
regulations that are reviewable by the courts.46
A number of questions arise as relevant to original policy
intent as it pertains to different forms of linkage. In practice
these can, and typically do, vary substantially from one nation
to the next. This is not surprising given the differing political,
economic, and technological landscapes involved. A related
issue is when the policy grounds put forward are similar in
varying jurisdictions, but the legal mechanisms underpinning
operation of the linkage regime differ, with potentially varying
outputs. How do the grounds offered in support of linkage
relate to other mechanisms for intellectual property protection
for pharmaceuticals, such as data protection, patent term
extension, etc.? Have the mechanisms favoring legal protection

46. Cameron Hutchinson, Which Kraft of Statutory Interpretation? A
Supreme Court of Canada Trilogy on Intellectual Property Law, 46 ALTA. L.
REV. 1, 7, 20 (2008).
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of pharmaceutical products been balanced by other
mechanisms in favor of price control? Our preliminary analysis
indicates significant differences among jurisdictions. Some
jurisdictions favor strong intellectual property protection and
linkage regulations without price controls, some are
considering price controls, and some express forms of antievergreening provisions47 balanced with regulation of generic
drug prices.
For example, in the United States where the linkage
regime first came into force, the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman
Act was explicitly to balance two competing policy objectives:
inducing brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments
necessary to research and develop new drug products, while
enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those
drugs to market as soon as possible.48 Indeed, during free trade
negotiations leading up to linkage in the United States,
Canada, and Australia,49 claims were made that linkage
regulations were necessary to provide incentives to firms to
engage in high risk research and development. In each
instance, universities were particularly keen to hitch their
wagon to the regulations.50 Senator Hatch, at the time the
American legislation came into force said “[t]he public receives
the best of both worlds - cheaper drugs today and better drugs
47. Evergreening “is a potentially perjorative term that generally refers to
the strategy of obtaining multiple patents that cover different aspects of the
same product, typically by obtaining patents on improved versions of existing
products.” John R. Thomas, Cong. Research Serv., R40917, Patent
“Evergreening”: Issues in Innovation and Competition 1 (2009).
48. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 28 (1984); Mylan Pharm. v. Thompson,
268 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Abbott Lab. v. Young, 920 F.2d
984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990)) (“These provisions of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments ‘emerged from Congress’ efforts to balance two conflicting policy
objectives: to induce name brand pharmaceutical firms to make the
investments necessary to research and develop new drug products, while
simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those
drugs to market.”’).
49. See Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 75–76
(documenting an empirical study with a specific emphasis on Canada’s
pharmaceutical linkage regulatory regime and its operation within the
Canadian legal system); Faunce & Lexchin, supra note 5, at 4–8 (outlining the
development of pharmaceutical linkage in Australia); Harrison, supra note 9,
at 473–77 (detailing negotiations between the United States and Canada that
involved changes to Canadian patent law in service of NAFTA and TRIPS);
Tancer, supra note 9, at 285–87 (describing historical factors leading to
pharmaceutical linkage in Canada).
50. See, e.g., Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 100 (speaking
directly to Canadian Universities); Tancer, supra note 9, at 290.
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tomorrow.”51 The same is true in Canada, as outlined clearly in
the government’s Regulatory Impact Analysis Statements on
the topic.52 Therefore, in addition to stimulating pioneering
drug development, a second major policy goal of linkage was to
facilitate timely generic entry.53
However, while the policy goals may be similar, the factual
baseline for legislation may differ significantly in different
nations, with the result that outcomes may change accordingly.
The United States and Canada present an excellent case study
in this regard. Prior to linkage in the Unites States, a large
number of drugs were off patent yet not marketed by generics
due in large part to regulatory costs resulting from the inability
to rely on the data in the original approval.54 This mechanism
was eventually provided by the Hatch-Waxman Amendments,
which resulted in, notwithstanding a certain level of gaming of

51. Epstein & Kuhlik, supra note 8, at 11 (quoting 130 CONG. REC.
S23,764 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch)).
52. Evidence of legislative intent regarding the “original policy intent” of
encouraging development of new and innovative drugs can be found in both
Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAS) and related Guidance
Documents. See Regulations Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations, 138 CAN. GAZE. PART I 3718, 3723, available at
http://www.gazette.gc.ca/archives/p1/2004/2004-12-11/pdf/g1-13850.pdf;
MINISTER OF HEALTH, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, PATENTED MEDICINES (NOTICE
OF COMPLIANCE) REGULATIONS [hereinafter GUIDANCE DOCUMENT], available
at
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/pdf/prodpharma/applicdemande/guide-ld/patmedbrev/pmreg3_mbreg3-eng.pdf. An articulation of the
government’s pharmaceutical policy as it relates to the Notice of Compliance
(NOC) Regulations can be found in the 2006 RIAS, which states:
The Government’s pharmaceutical patent policy seeks to balance
effective patent enforcement over new and innovative drugs with the
timely market entry of their lower priced generic competitors. The
current manner in which that balance is realized was established in
1993, with the enactment of Bill C-91, the Patent Act Amendment
Act, 1992, S.C. 1993, c. 2.
Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra note 12, at 181 n.44.
53. Daniel R. Cahoy, Patent Fences and Constitutional Fence Posts:
Property Barriers to Pharmaceutical Importation, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 623, 633–34 (2005).
54. For example, in the United States generics could not use NDA holder’s
data to demonstrate safety and efficacy and were forced to conduct clinical
trials to support market authorization. Avery, supra note 8, at 174–75. Before
Hatch-Waxman, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration demonstrated that
approximately 150 brand drugs were on the market with expired patents, but
with no generic equivalents. This resulted in hundreds of million dollars in out
of pocket consumer expenditures. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 27–33 (1984).
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the system,55 the United States developing a strong generic
industry that is paralleled by a strong brand pharmaceutical
industry. In contrast, Canada had a substantial domestic
generic industry prior to linkage predicated, in part, by
provisions
allowing
for
compulsory
licensing
of
pharmaceuticals.56 The result of linkage in Canada, as some
have claimed, is a diminished generic industry.57 However,
since many of the companies are privately held and do not
disclose detailed financial data, this claim cannot be verified.
Linkage, however, has not led to any change in the level of
global competitiveness for national life science firms as
originally anticipated,58 and in fact Merck has recently closed
its main Canadian research laboratory.59
Given that the second and third entrant linkage regimes,
Canada and Australia respectively, are separated by a decade,
it is reasonable to conclude the Canadian linkage regime was
viewed as a kind of “test case” for American trade negotiators.
Further, it is reasonable to say, given the available evidence,
that this discrete and time-gated yet natural experiment has
been a success. Of interest, 25 years after Hatch-Waxman, a
similar situation is currently developing in India and, perhaps,
Italy. The former nation, which like Canada prior to linkage is
home to a well-developed generic drug industry, is in the midst
of an intense legal battle over whether or not to institute some
form of pharmaceutical linkage.60 In contrast to the debates
55. Bulow, supra note 8, at 159–73; Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 8, at 14;
Aidan Hollis, Closing the FDA’s Orange Book, REG., Winter 2007, at 14–17,
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv24n4/v24n4-2.pdf; Avery,
supra note 8, at 172.
56. Harrison, supra note 9, at 487–60; Tancer supra note 9, at 283–84.
57. See HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD, supra note 26, at 3; Lexchin, supra note
5, at 72–73; Joel Lexchin, Intellectual Property Rights and the Canadian
Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Where Do We Go from Here?, 35 INT’L. J.
HEALTH SERV. 237, 243 (2005).
58. Cf. EXPERT PANEL ON COMMERCIALIZATION, PEOPLE & EXCELLENCE:
THE HEART OF SUCCESSFUL COMMERCIALIZATION 6, 17 (2006) [hereinafter
EXPERT PANEL], available at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/Iu4-782006E-I.pdf (documenting Canada’s struggle to improve their productivity
growth).
59. Quebec Merck closure could mean ‘brain drain’: Pharmaceutical giant
shuts 16 facilities, including Montreal-area research facility, CBCNEWS (July
8, 2010, 9:07 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal/story/2010/07/08/merckclosures.html.
60. In 2008, Bayer moved the Delhi High Court to seek a declaration
against the drug regulatory authority, Drug Controller General of India
(DCGI). See Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, LPA 443/2009 (Delhi H.C.) (India).
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over the reach of linkage in Canada, Australia and India, the
law relating to linkage in Mexico has been interpreted
explicitly to encompass the link between market authorization
and patents.61 Linkage has recently been interpreted by the
Mexican Supreme Court to include not only active ingredient
patents,
but
also
patents
covering
pharmaceutical
formulations.62 Processes are still expressly excluded in Mexico;
the inclusion of patents covering uses remains hotly contested.
In this particular case, the policy intent does not seem to be
derived from compliance with international treaties but instead
for coherence within the system, where exclusive rights granted
by government through a patent are not invaded through a
marketing authorization granted by a separate branch of the
same government.
In addition to jurisdictional variability in the
establishment of the generic drug industry prior to linkage,
another major comparative issue that we have identified is the
use of the Bolar, or “safe harbor,” provision as a policy lever in
pharmaceutical linkage regimes.63 The impetus for a focus on
the Bolar provision is that the legal nexus between drug
approval and drug patenting under linkage can trace its history
The Court directed the DCGI to refrain from passing an order of market
approval for an Indian generic company, Cipla for its generic version of the
drug ‘Soranib.’ Id. para. 7. Bayer based its arguments on the assertion that
Section two of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act read with section forty-eight of the
Patents Act provided for the concept of patent linkage. Id. para. 8. Justice
Ravindra Bhatt dismissed Bayer’s arguments for creating linkage between
patent grants and marketing approvals. Id. para. 7. Bayer appealed the
decision of the Single Judge before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.
Id. para. 1. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal. Id. para. 37. Bayer filed
an appeal from decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court to the
Supreme Court of India; the Supreme Court dismissed Bayer’s appeal refusing
to interfere with the finding of the High Court of Delhi. India: Supreme Court
Dismisses Bayer’ Petition in Patent Linkage Matter, GENERIC PHARM. & IP
(Dec. 2, 2010), http://genericpharmaceuticals.blogspot.com/2010/12/indiasupreme-court-dismisses-bayer.html.
61. See Luis C. Schmidt, Mexico moves to improve Pharmaceutical Product
&
CIA,
Registration
Process,
OLIVARES
http://www.olivares.com.mx/Knowledge/Articles/CopyrightArticles/Mexicomov
estoimprovePharmaceuticalProductRegistrationProcess (last visited June 13,
2011).
62. Juan Serrano, Mexican Supreme Court Decides on Broad
Interpretation of Linkage Regulations, PATENT DOCS (Mar. 9, 2010, 11:43 PM),
http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/03/mexican-supreme-court-decides-on-broadinterpretation-of-linkage-regulations.html.
63. See infra notes 67–75 and accompanying text.
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back to insertion of early working provisions into the
infringement section of patent legislation in the United States
and Canada. As discussed further below the Bolar provision
was also a focus in the decision by Indian appellate courts to
reject linkage. For this reason, the law and policy relating to
the Bolar provision is pivotal to the analysis of the effectiveness
and efficiency of pharmaceutical linkage as a policy vehicle.
Despite the “scant legislative history” underpinning the
linkage regime,64 the U.S. Committee on Energy and
Commerce (CEC) noted, in its influential report, that the locus
of the legal nexus between drug approval and drug patenting
under Hatch-Waxman was specifically through the
infringement section of patent legislation. In this manner,
approval and marketing of generic substitutes was
fundamentally linked to patents associated with new and
innovative drugs developed by brand pharmaceutical firms. As
to which patents were considered relevant to the generic
substitute, the CEC stated the law would be aimed at
protecting the first product patent per drug or, if there was no
product patent, the first process patent. In addition, the CEC
recognized that “in some instances” (e.g., situations where
there were product and use patents relevant to an existing
marketed product as opposed to only a product patent) the
listing of multiple patents on the patent register would be
foreseeable.65

64. Mylan Pharm. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(noting that the “scant legislative history” did not allow defendants to find
congressional intent to create a private action to delist a patent from the
Orange Book).
65. H.R. REP NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 22 (1984) (acknowledging that multiple
patents would be listed on the patent register to delay generic entry).
Specifically, the Committee recognized two different types of patents being
properly listed on the patent register. These included
[A]ll product patents which claim the listed drug and all use patents
which claim an indication for the drug for which the applicant is
seeking approval (hereafter described as a controlling use patent), the
applicant must certify, in his opinion and to the best of his knowledge,
as to one of four circumstances. . . . [T]he Committee recognize[d] that
in some instances an applicant will have to make multiple
certifications with respect to product or controlling use patents. For
example, if the product patent has expired and a valid controlling use
patent will not expire for three years, then the applicant must certify
that one patent has expired and the other will expire in three years.
The Committee intends that the applicant make the appropriate
certification for each product and controlling use patent.
Id. (emphasis added).

01 BOUCHARD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

412

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

8/1/2011 1:37 PM

[Vol. 12:2

The balance of the early working exemption favoring
generics gauged against the ability of brand firms to commence
legal action prior to generic marketing was viewed by the CEC
to “fairly balance” the rights of brand patent owners with those
of generic entrants that wish to contest the validity and/or
infringement of a patent before such patents expire.66 No
further protection for brand firms was deemed needed in view
of other incentives to firms for innovative drug development.
While allowing for multiple patents to be listed on the
register, the CEC nevertheless explicitly noted that the ability
of brand firms to delay generic entry using the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments should be narrow both in scope and time; the
proper time for generic entry being “the expiration date of the
valid patent covering the original product” and that “there
should be no other direct or indirect method of extending
patent term.”67 The extension of patent protection was viewed
to be effectively and directly accomplished by Title II of the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments allowing for patent term
restoration.68 The standard for listing is that a claim of patent
infringement “could reasonably be asserted.”69 The legal nexus
between drug approval and drug patenting under the Canadian
linkage regime also operates through the infringement section

66. Id. at 28. The Committee noted
[T]his additional remedy permits the commencement of a legal action
for patent infringement before the generic drug maker has begun
marketing. The Committee believes this procedure fairly balances the
rights of a patent owner to prevent others from making, using, or
selling its patented product and the rights of third parties to contest
the validity of a patent or to market a product which they believe is
not claimed by the patent.
Id.
67. Id. at 46. The Committee elaborated, stating that
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress
to grant exclusive rights to an inventor for a limited time. That
limited time should be a definite time and, thereafter, immediate
competition should be encouraged. For That reason, Title I of the bill
permits the filing of abbreviated new drug applications before a
patent expires and contemplates that the effective approval date will
be the expiration date of the valid patent covering the original
product. Other sections of Title II permit the extension of the term of
a patent for a definite time provided certain conditions are met. There
should be no other direct or indirect method of extending patent term.
Id.
68. Id. at 17–18.
69. Id. at 31.
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of relevant patent legislation.70 Thus, in order to assess the
effectiveness of linkage as a policy lever one must do so through
the lens of the Bolar provision as it works in tandem with
infringement law and other legislation intended to encourage
the development of new and innovative drugs, while also
facilitating the timely entry of generic drugs.71 For these
reasons, linkage legislation balances competing policy
interests.72
As well described in the literature, the Bolar provision
enshrined in the safe harbor provision of Hatch-Waxman73
allows “early working” of patented inventions prior to generic
entry. While the terms Bolar provision and early working
provision are often used conterminously, recent jurisprudence
suggests that one may be enfolded within the other and not
vice-versa.74 As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Merck v.
Integra, the purpose of safe harbor is to protect basic research
and development activities that contribute to the generation of
information required by drug regulators in order to approve a
new drug product.75 The safe harbor provision can be compared
to the Bolar provision, which is more narrowly aimed at
facilitating timely generic entry after patent protection for a
new product expires. In language reminiscent of that employed
by the High Court of Dehli in Bayer v. India to reject linkage,
the court in Roche v. Bolar denied the request to be exempt
from patent infringement proceedings, in order to work-up the
generic product ahead of patent expiry.76 Shortly after Bolar
70. See generally Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, para. 33, 58 (Can.) (discussing the procedural steps that
must be followed by generic producers pursuant to the Patent Act and the
‘patent-specific’ analysis necessary to interpret the linkage regulations);
AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560,
para. 27, 37–39 (Can.) (discussing the obligations of generic manufacturers
and the “early working” exception to patent infringement and reinforcing the
‘patent-specific’ analysis of linkage first established in Biolyse v. BMS, supra.).
71. See Biolyse Pharma Corp., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, para. 133.
72. See Id. at para. 133, 189.
73. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
74. Merk KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005).
75. Id.
76. Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863–64 (Fed. Cir.
1984). Justice Nichols stated
Bolar argues that even if no established doctrine exists with which it
can escape liability for patent infringement, public policy requires
that we create a new exception to the use prohibition. Parties and
amici seem to think, in particular, that we must resolve a conflict
between the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), and the
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was released, however, the U.S. Congress enacted an exception
to the patent infringement rule, for uses “reasonably related to
the development and submission of information,” in order to
facilitate timely generic entry by reducing the regulatory lag
for bioequivalence testing and regulatory approval.77
It is reasonable to speculate that the policy grounds,
expected outcomes and outputs, and legal mechanisms
underpinning brand and generic drug development pathways
do, and indeed should, differ. To begin with, it seems
reasonable to state that as a policy vehicle the safe harbor
provision extends beyond the scope of Bolar to facilitate generic
entry. For example, in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences, Justice Scalia held that §
271(e)(1) protected all basic research leading up to and
“reasonably related” to the process of developing information
for a regulatory submission. Justice Scalia noted specifically
that the safe harbor provision was not limited in scope to be so
narrow as to only support an abbreviated new drug application
(ANDA), or generic submission.78
Patent Act of 1952, or at least the Acts’ respective policies and
purposes. We decline the opportunity here, however, to engage in
legislative activity proper only for the Congress.
Id. (citations omitted). But see Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, LPA 443/2009,
para. 14 (Delhi H.C.) (India) (finding that linkage prevents competition and
contradicts public health policy).
77. See Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 195. The Court in Merck found, “[i]t is
generally an act of patent infringement to ‘mak[e], us[e], offe[r] to sell, or sel[l]
any patented invention . . . during the term of the patent therefor.’” Id.
(alternations in original). Further, Justice Scalia went on to quote the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States or import into the United States a patented
invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological
product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) . . . ) solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs . . . .
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984, § 202, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006)).
78. Id. at 206. The Court stated
The statutory text does not require such a result. Congress did not
limit § 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor to the development of information for
inclusion in a submission to the FDA; nor did it create an exemption
applicable only to the research relevant to filing an ANDA for
approval of a generic drug. Rather, it exempted from infringement all
uses of patented compounds “reasonably related” to the process of
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Reading Merck together with Bolar and the HatchWaxman Amendments, it seems that while the safe harbor
provision of § 271(e)(1) is intended to facilitate generic entry,
the scope of the provision as an exception to patent
infringement is broader and more inclusive; it encourages
research and development into both new and generic drugs
more broadly. On the one hand, the provision protects research
activities on new and innovative therapeutic products from
infringement litigation by patent owners in circumstances
where such research can reasonably lead to a regulatory
submission.79 In the absence of such a safe harbor, research of
this nature would be chilled to the detriment of both
competition and the public.80 On the other hand, the provision
also protects generic firms from infringement while working-up
their regulatory submissions. However, it does not necessarily
follow that if a certain scope of patents is subject to the safe
harbor of § 271(e)(1) to encourage innovation, an equally broad
scope of patents must be included under the linkage umbrella
in order to delay generic entry on older drugs.
While Bolar is maintained as legal justification for linkage
in the United States,81 Canada,82 and elsewhere (such as the
developing information for submission under any federal law
regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of drugs. We decline
to read the “reasonable relation” requirement so narrowly as to
render § 271(e)(1)’s stated protection of activities leading to FDA
approval for all drugs illusory. Properly construed, § 271(e)(1) leaves
adequate space for experimentation and failure on the road to
regulatory approval: At least where a drugmaker has a reasonable
basis for believing that a patented compound may work, through a
particular biological process, to produce a particular physiological
effect, and uses the compound in research that, if successful, would be
appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA, that use is
“reasonably related” to the “development and submission of
information under . . . Federal law.”
Id. (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original).
79. See id. at 206–07.
80. See Bouchard, KSR v. Teleflex Part 1, supra note 4, at 243 (“The
Solicitor General stated in its KSR brief that SCOTUS jurisprudence stood for
the historical proposition that the obviousness requirement is critical to
ensure free exploitation of ideas is the rule, to which the protection of a federal
patent is the exception.”); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
419 (2007); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); Royal
Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc. 168 F.2d 691 (2nd Cir. 1948);
Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, para. 37 (Can.); Free
World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024 (Can.).
81. See Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 206–07; Mylan Pharm. v. Thompson,
268 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
82. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 73–74.
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European Union, India, and Mexico),83 the policy grounds have
never been elucidated as to how or indeed why infringement
law may be properly used to extend beyond early working of a
patent on a particular drug, to linkage with many patents on
many drugs.84 For example, the rationale used to support
linkage in Canada was that generic entry would occur on expiry
of the “main patent” on a given product.85 The maximum delay
for generic products was claimed to be equal to that for generic
approval prior to linkage, or two to three years.86 No legal
mechanism or policy grounds were offered to prohibit generic
entry based on the expiry of multiple patents that relate to the
new and innovative drug only distantly in time, particularly
the expiry of multiple patents on multiple related drug forms
(tablet “following on” capsule form, monohydrate “following on”
dihydrate crystalline form, besylate salt “following on”
mesylate salt form, enantiomer “following” on racemic mixture,
etc.).87 Provisions enabling the extension of market exclusivity
in this manner only appeared once the regulations
accompanying amendments to patent legislation were

83. See generally Final Report, supra note 22, at 122 (July 8, 2009) (noting
that a Bolar provision was introduced into the EU regulatory framework in
2004, and that “‘the research exemption’ originally foreseen in the Community
Patent Convention as a general exemption from patent infringement for ‘acts
done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented
invention’ was widely adopted in the national patent legislations of EU
Member States.”); Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, LPA 443/2009, para. 7–8 (the
court denied Bayer Corporation’s request for the Drug Controller General of
India to withhold a drug license to another company, holding that the
argument against patent linkage was based on the notion that the entry of
generic drugs resulted in saving of expenditure and health costs, and that
“[s]uch linkage would undermine the ‘Bolar/Early Working’ of the patent and
deny space for generic medicines.”).
84. See Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 112–13, 115–21.
85. See id. at 120 (the federal government testified to the Parliamentary
Committee stating that “a new and innovative drug was said to have ‘[one]
main patent’ and ‘w[h]en that main patent expires, anyone may copy that
product and bring it to market.’” (quoting Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-91, 34:8 Parliament of
Canada, 8:37 (Dec. 1, 1992) (alteration in original)).
86. See id. at 94 (“It is reasonable to speculate however that ‘but for’ the
existence of the linkage regime that generic entry may have occurred closer to
expiry of the originating patent or patents . . . with an accordingly short period
of delayed entry. . . . the linkage regime has proved to be a highly effective
mechanism for extending market monopolies on profitable drugs.”).
87. See id. at 112–13 (discussing the response to concerns that multiple
patents could be listed on the patent register).
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published.88
The idea that only a “main patent” should be protected is
congruent with the statement by the CEC to the effect that the
appropriate time for generic entry was the expiration date of
the valid patent covering the original product and that there
should be no further method of extending patent term. In light
of the statement by the Federal Circuit in Mylan that HatchWaxman not only creates the statutory act of infringement but
also defines the conditions under which a defense to
infringement is available, the number and scope of patents
listed on the patent register is crucial to assessing whether the
legislation is working consistent with its objective of balancing
the competing policy objectives of stimulating innovative
research and enhancing generic entry.89
In light of the above discussion it is somewhat curious that
both the courts and (various) government branches responsible
for bringing into force the originating linkage regimes in North
America have remained largely silent on the policy grounds
underpinning the multiple patent listing model, other than to
say generally that it fairly balances the rights of brand patent
owners with those of generic entrants under certain narrow
conditions.90
Given the lack of policy debate combined with the
significant public health implications involved, it is not
surprising that some Appellate Courts have taken a dim view
of unduly broadening the drug approval―drug patenting
nexus, to the detriment of generic entry. The Supreme Court of
Canada, in its leading decisions on linkage—Biolyse91 and
AstraZeneca92—narrowly construed its analysis on the breadth
of drug submissions and patent listing within the terms of the

88. See id. at 134–35 (“[The] linkage regime has only been in existence for
about 25 years following passage of . . . the Canadian NOC regulations in
1993.”).
89. Mylan Pharm. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d at 1331, 1331 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (stating that the Amendments “were made both to the FFDCA [(the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act)] and to Title 35 of the United States
Code relating to patents.”).
90. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 28 (1984); see also discussion supra
note 66.
91. See Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R.
533, para. 5 (Can.).
92. See AstraZeneca Can. Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2004] F.C.
1278, para. 40–41 (Can.).
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Patent Act.93 The court in AstraZeneca held that under the
Notice of Compliance (NOC) Regulations it was necessary to
undertake a “patent-specific analysis” rather than a broad
inclusive reading of the terms “drug submission” and “patent
listing,” which would enable the undue prolonging of market
exclusivity.94 This holding was taken to be consistent with that
of the quid pro quo traditional patent bargain.95
In Bayer v. India, the High Court of Delhi went one step
further, holding that the North American model of linkage,
encompassing as it does multiple patents listed per drug or
groupings of related drugs, would undermine the early working
aspect of Bolar, deny space for generic drugs in the
marketplace, and mitigate the positive impact of generic drugs
on healthcare expenditures and costs.96 The court based its
decision in part based on the finding that patent linkage is a
“TRIPS-Plus” concept and that India had only signed on to
TRIPS. Justice Muralindhar noted for the court that
“[w]orldwide there is a raging debate on whether patent
linkage should be permitted. There is no uniformity in the
policy of different countries . . . .”97 Earlier in the decision,
Judge Muralindhar noted that there was a growing opinion in
developed countries, including the European Union, that
cautioned against linkage. 98
Based on a sort of ‘middle way’ reading of appellate cases
93. See
Patent
Act
R.S.C.
1985,
c.P-4,
available
at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/Statute/P/P-4.pdf.
94. See AstraZeneca Can. Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2
S.C.R. 560, para. 39 (Can.) (“Given the evident . . . commercial strategy of the
innovative drug companies to evergreen their products by adding bells and
whistles to a pioneering product even after the original patent for that
pioneering product has expired, the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal
would reward evergreening even if the generic manufacturer (and thus the
public) does not thereby derive any benefit from the subsequently listed
patents.”).
95. Guidance Document, supra note 52, at 27 (Confirming a “patent
specific analysis” relating to the NOC Regulations.). Further, the Canadian
government stated that only certain patents are eligible for protection under
the NOC regulations, indicating that not all patents fall within the purview of
the regulations. Id. at 11; see also Ferring Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health),
[2007] F.C. 300, para. 57 (Can.) (confirming the patent-specific analysis).
96. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, LPA 443/2009, para. 7 (Delhi H.C.)
(India) (“Such linkage would undermine the ‘Bolar/Early Working’ of the
patent and deny space for generic medicines.”).
97. Bayer Corp., LPA 443/2009, at para. 32.
98. Id. at para 7.
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such as these, one could conclude that the primary problem
with pharmaceutical linkage may not be the concept of linkage
itself (e.g., balancing generic early working and brand patent
protection), but rather the breadth of the legal nexus between
drug approval and drug patenting, as well as well as how the
regulations operate within the larger system of policy levers,
which are intended to stimulate brand and generic drug
development. Both issues are dealt with in detail in the
discussion that follows.

Figure 1: Therapeutic Product Lifecycle Innovation
Incentives

The figure illustrates the complex interrelated legal mechanisms
comprising the system of innovation incentives for brand and generic
drug development. The left and right y axes are qualitative
innovation and public benefit indices. The x axis represents the
product development lifecycle over time. Black waveforms represent
the progression of drug development from publicly funded university
research to commercialization of medical products by firms (large
peak), followed by subsequent genericization (smaller peak). The slow
ramp to peak in each case represents the amount of research and
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development necessary to prepare for and obtain regulatory approval.
As indicated by the dotted black lines, the degree of innovative
research involved in going from baseline (a) to brand products (c) is
much greater than that required for generic drugs (b). The red
waveform normalizes the generic curve for public benefit owing to
price competition. Brand and generic drug development are
incentivized at various points in the lifecycle by numerous policy
levers, including the broad (research and development) and narrow
(Bolar) components of the Hatch-Waxman (Title I) safe harbor
provision, patenting by universities and firms stimulated by BayhDole and the traditional patent system, patent term extension under
Hatch-Waxman (Title II), data exclusivity for brand regulatory
submission packages under TRIPS and other FTAs, and
pharmaceutical linkage under Title I of Hatch-Waxman. Time gates
for the various policy levers illustrated at the bottom of the figure are
not intended to be closed, but rather reflect their general timing in
the context of the product development lifecycle.

Figure 1 illustrates the complex system of legal incentives
typically employed globally for developing brand and generic
drugs, using the United States as an example. This system
encompasses a number of interrelated policy-levers, such as
traditional patent incentives for firms and universities under
patent and Bayh-Dole legislation.99 It also includes the broad
research exemption for preclinical and clinical research for
originator firms under Title I of Hatch-Waxman, multiple data
exclusivity periods for regulatory submissions by originator
firms under TRIPS and FTAs (such as NAFTA), and extended
patent terms to originator firms to compensate for regulatory
delays under Title II of Hatch-Waxman. Additionally, provision
is made for extended patent protection for brand firms under
the linkage regulation provisions of Title I of Hatch-Waxman
for products in later stages of development, and the safe harbor
for generic products under Title I of Hatch-Waxman. As
indicated by a comparison of the Y-axis data, brand products
have a greater level of innovation, entail a greater degree of
research and development, and have a broader scope of safe
harbor protection than their generic counterparts. The generic
products nevertheless have a substantial public welfare benefit,
compared to pioneering products, due to their fractional cost. It
is worth noting that, notwithstanding the large public welfare

99. For a discussion on the Bayh-Dole legislation, see Bhaven N. Sampat,
Patenting and U.S. Academic Research in the 20th Century: The World Before
and After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL’Y 772 (2006).
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benefit ascribed to generic drugs, only one of the seven policy
levers described in Figure 1 is aimed at facilitating generic
entry—the Bolar provision.100
It appears reasonable to assume that legal vehicles, such
as those depicted in Figure 1, are intended to work together to
foster innovation while providing as much public value as
possible by facilitating generic entry.101 Indeed the Committee
on the Judiciary stated in 1984 that the amendments were
consistent with the traditional role of Congress to “balance the
need to stimulate innovation against the goal of furthering the
public interest,” in this case increasing the availability of
generic substitutes.102 However, while the rationale for linking
the Bolar exemption to multiple patents listed on the patent
register may at one time have been aimed at balance (e.g., a
safe harbor abeyance from infringement during the working-up
phase to the detriment of patentees, balanced by effective
intellectual property protection on innovative drugs in favor of
patentees), empirical data that exists at this point suggests the
balance effected through this specific legal mechanism may not
work as envisioned.
One of the most abundant areas of debate regarding
pharmaceutical linkage is whether the provision allowing
multiple patents to be listed on the patent register is the main
culprit, as opposed to strategic abuse of the automatic stay
provision, which is usually singled out as the water thrown on
the fire of timely generic entry.103 Ironically, in Bolar, litigation
was focused on a single patent (relating to the sleep aid
flurazepam), rather than a cluster of product, use, route of
administration, process, and combination therapy patents, that
in turn can be listed on multiple chemical forms of the same
original drug.104 The conclusion one can draw from this
analysis is that the drug approval-drug patent nexus under
linkage law should be construed narrowly rather than broadly,

100. See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text.
101. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 25 (1984).
102. Id. at 26.
103. See Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 8, at 24 (“[T]hrough misapplication of
complex regulatory schemes, the FDA process is subject to abuse by parties
claiming protections to which they are not legally entitled, and which are,
technically, legally impossible.”); HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD, supra nota 26, at
3; Avery, supra note 8, at 173; Bulow, supra note 8, at 26.
104. See Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir.
1984)
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which is consistent with its original purpose in Bolar.105
Simply because infringement of one or more patents may
be held in abeyance, while a generic company works-up its
manufacturing processes prior to regulatory approval, does not
justify the grant of prolonged market exclusivity for a cache of
older drugs protected by a large group of patents, many of
which may be invalid or not infringed by the generic
equivalent.106 Moreover, the policy goal of holding patent
infringement in abeyance under the safe harbor provision
desires that equally strong patents will be associated with the
regulatory submission of the party requesting abeyance, and
that competing products will be developed. It is reasonable to
assume there should be an analogous reciprocity under the
linkage regime, as generic products are by nature less
innovative, but have substantial social benefits owing to price
competition. In light of the foregoing, it seems reasonable to
conclude that generic products should not be prevented from
gaining regulatory approval by a cluster of follow-on patents
that are associated with new and innovative drug products only
distantly in time; the original goal of Bolar was to minimize the
regulatory lag for generic firms to work-up regulatory
submissions and obtain approval.107 This can be contrasted to
the much more substantial increase in cumulative patent
protection that can result from listing multiple weak patents
against one or more marketed drugs.
The discussion thus far suggests that it is plausible that
provisions in linkage laws allowing multiple patents to be listed
against a given drug over time, with little or no requirement for

105. See id. at 863.
106. See FED. TRADE COMM’N 2002, supra note 11, at viii.
[D]ata in the study suggest that the generic applicants have brought
appropriate patent challenges: generic applicants prevailed in nearly
75% of the patent litigation ultimately resolved by a court
decision. . . . [and] most generic applicants have waited to enter the
market until at least a district court has held that the patent covering
the brand-name company’s drug product was invalid or not infringed
by the ANDA.”); HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD, supra note 26, at 5 (“Since
1998, generic pharmaceutical manufacturers have won at least 75% of
the cases under the Regulations. However, even when the generic
firm wins the court cases, the brand-name drug company has
successfully extended its market monopoly, sometimes for years after
the expiry of the basic patents.
Id.
107. See supra notes
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proportional public welfare benefit, represents the weak link in
the regulations as they currently operate. This can be argued
for two reasons. First, patents may be listed on the patent
register as long as they meet statutory listing requirements
and are deemed relevant to the marketed drug—relevant being
a term that has proven very difficult to legally define.108 It
appears that the relevance requirement can at times be very
minimal,109 with the effect that often multiple patents are
108. See generally Mylan Pharm. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (“The Hatch-Waxman Amendments . . . do not include any explicit
provisions . . . enabling or prohibiting an action to challenge a patentee’s
listing of a patent . . . the FDA has provided a limited process for disputing the
accuracy or relevance of patent information submitted to the FDA . . . .”). The
Court explained that
One who questions the accuracy of the patent information may write
to the FDA, and the FDA will request that the applicant confirm the
information. . . . [but] ‘[u]nless the application holder withdraws or
amends its patent information in response to FDA’s request, the
agency will not change the patent information in the list . . . .
Id. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As noted in earlier work by our group, top appellate courts in
Canada have wavered substantially on the issue over the last half decade:
Early Federal Court of Appeal jurisprudence in Eli Lilly v. Canada
rejected the notion of a strict relevance requirement, opting instead
for a narrow statutory reading to the effect that patents need only be
relevant to a medicine rather than the drug form specifically
approved by regulators. In other words, patents could be listed
generally for a drug rather than against a specific drug submission.
In 2006, the government issued a Regulatory Impact Analysis
Statement (RIAS) accompanying amendments to the NOC
Regulations explaining that listed patents were required to contain at
least one specific claim to the medical ingredient, formulation, dosage
form or use for which approval was granted. This was followed by the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in AstraZeneca v. Canada,
which supported a specific relevance requirement and cast doubt on
the reasoning employed by lower courts in defending a general listing
requirement. The Federal Court of Appeal, citing AstraZeneca,
reversed its earlier ruling that a patent containing a claim for the
medicine in a drug is listed generally against the drug, rather than
against the specific submission for a notice of compliance upon which
the patent list is based. The government issued a revised guidance
document in 2009 attempting to harmonize previous jurisprudence
and policy grounds supporting a specific listing requirement.
Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra note 12, at 180–81.
109. See Wyeth Canada v. Ratiopharm Inc., [2008] 1 F.C.R. 447, 462 (Can.
Ont. C.A.).
[a] generic drug manufacturer initially may be required to
address every patent listed in respect of the Canadian reference
product to which the proposed generic version is compared,
whether or not the patent is properly listed. If there is an
allegation of invalidity or noninfringement, the NOA may lead to
a prohibition application and the commencement of the automatic
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listed per drug, particularly for high value pharmaceuticals.110
The rationale typically used for this low listing requirement
has been that drug regulators are not equipped to assess
patents on the register. Ironically, In Bayer v. India, the same
rationale was used to reject linkage.111
Second, and more importantly, is the fact that multiple
patents do not exist in isolation; both in scope and time. They
are interconnected to multiple related drugs through weak
regulatory submission requirements,112 which in turn allow for
large numbers of follow-on drugs comprising a temporally
evolving cluster of related products and patents.113 As a result,
24 month statutory stay. However, the generic drug
manufacturer may move under paragraph 6(5)(a) of the NOC
Regulations for an order dismissing the prohibition application
entirely, or dismissing it in relation to the improperly listed
patent or patents.
Id. See also GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 52, at 7–8 (“[A] patent will be
eligible where it is relevant to the drug which is the subject of the submission
against which the patent is to be listed. More precisely, the factors for
determining the eligibility of a patent submitted with a drug submission,”
including factors such as “medicinal ingredient,” or a “formulation that
contains the medicinal ingredient . . . dosage form . . . or use of the medicinal
ingredient.”) (emphasis added); see also AstraZeneca Can., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560,
para. 39 (“[T]he NOC Regulations require[] a patent-specific analysis, i.e. the
generic manufacturer is only required to address the cluster of patents listed
against submissions relevant to the NOC that gave rise to the comparator
drug . . . .”) (emphasis added).
110. EDWARD HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD, supra note 26, at 20–23
(discussing how brand name drug companies can use different listing
strategies to continue evergreening their patents). Dr. Marcia Angell stated
that “[n]othing drug companies do is as profitable as stretching out monopoly
rights on their blockbusters”). Id. at 21; see also Bouchard et al., Drug
Approval-Drug Patenting, supra note 12 (demonstrating empirically that 5% of
granted patents are listed on the patent register for blockbuster drugs);
Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom, supra note 12 (demonstrating
empirically, that while 5% of granted patents are listed on the patent register
on average, the percentage grows substantially with profit such that over 20
patents can be listed and litigated on the most profitable drugs); Hemphill &
Lemley, supra note 13; Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 13.
111. Bayer Corporation & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. LPA 443/2009
(Dehli H.C.) (India).
112. Cf. Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra note 12, at
188–90 (describing how the broad scope of regulatory approval for new and
follow-on drugs supports the extension of patent monopolies on older
blockbuster drugs).
113. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 126:
Product clusters are hypothesized to be comprised of an everexpanding number of follow-on drugs centered on a single new and
original drug. Products in the cluster are surrounded by a halo of
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originator firms appear to have transferred the thrust of their
competitive activities away from competition between each
other and towards encouraging competition within their own
formulary departments.114 The goal of this internal competition
appears to be to produce as many follow-on drugs as possible in
order to keep generics off market for as long as possible. This
has been referred to as portfolio-based innovation, analogous to
portfolio financing.115 There is no question that portfolio-based
innovation is a superb form of innovation from an
organizational perspective. The question is, is it desirable from
patents, all of which are interconnected between products within a
given cluster. These patents serve two primary functions. First, they
provide support for follow-on drug development within in the cluster,
and second they provide fodder for listing on the patent register to
delay generic entry on the original new and innovative drug. The
greater the number of patents permitted to be listed on the patent
register and the greater the scope of patent classifications per patent,
the greater the ability of patents to support a product cluster and
thus to delay generic entry….. Clearly different clusters will have
different spatiotemporal characteristics, for example whether they
represent clustering within or between brand-name firms or whether
there is a single or small number of truly new and innovative drugs
per cluster, but the clustering effect of follow-on drugs and associated
patents over time remains a central theme.
See generally BENGT DOMEIJ, PHARMECUTICAL PATENTS IN EUROPE (2000)
(noting the linkage between the pharmaceutical industry and patent
legislation in Europe and how European patent law allows the exclusion of
competition for products on a fixed time scale); Bengt Domeij, Initial and
Follow-on Pharmaceutical Inventions in Europe, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 177–98 (Ove Granstrand, ed., 2003) (examining
court decisions in Europe and identifying ways in which courts can create
extra incentives for valuable follow-on inventions).
114. For a defense of the innovative nature of follow-on drugs, see Joseph
A. DiMasi & Cherie Paquette, The Economics of Follow-on Drug Research and
Development Trends in Entry Rates and the Timing of Development 22
PHARMACOECONOMICS (SUPPLEMENT 2) 1 (2004); Joseph Di Masi and Laura
Faden, Competitiveness In Follow-On Drug R&D: A Race Or Imitation? 10
NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 23 (2011). For a rebuttal to DiMasi, see: Aidan
Hollis, Comment on The Economics of Follow-On Drug Research and
Development: Trends in Entry Rates and the Timing of Development, 23
PHARMACOECONOMICS 1187 (2005).
115. E.g., William Kingston, Intellectual Property’s Problems: How Far is
the U.S. Constitution to Blame?, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 315, 327 (2002) (noting
that changes to the U.S. Patent Act in 1952 have created a situation that
conduces to the development of a portfolio of patents which allow
pharmaceutical companies to spread the risk of research and development
across a wide portfolio of related projects under common control). Similarly,
Polk and Parchomovsky observed that the right to exclude conferred by a
collection of related patents under common control is greater than the sum of
individual patents. R. Polk Wagner & Gideon Parchomovsky, Patent
Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2006).
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a social welfare perspective?
In the era pre-dating pharmaceutical linkage, brand
pharmaceutical firms typically developed discrete drugs that
were associated with one or a small number of patents; once
that small number of patents expired, products could be
copied.116 In this scheme, pharmaceutical firms were in a
similar position to firms in other industries, including those in
other technology-heavy sectors.117 An argument can be made
that this process in turn provided an incentive for competition
between brand firms, consistent with judicial articulations of
the ends and means underpinning the traditional patent
bargain.118
A different situation has evolved in the post-linkage era,
where loopholes in linkage laws appear to favor a drug
development strategy that privileges “product clusters.”119

116. For a review of the relationship of these changes to the multiple
patent listing model under linkage, see Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading
Whom?, supra note 12; Bouchard, Still Your Baby, supra note 5. For a review
of “technology-specific” patent law, see Dan Burk & Mark A. Lemley. Is Patent
Law Technology Specific?, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155, 1157–1208 (2002).
117. For a review of major changes in United States and global patent law
since 1952 and the impact of these changes on patent portfolios and drug
development, see Kingston Id and Stuart Macdonald, When Means Become
Ends: Considering the Impact of Patent Strategy on Innovation, 16 Info. Econ.
& Pol’y 135 (2004).
118. For analysis of balancing patent law and competition law in U.S.
appellate jurisprudence, see, for example, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (noting that in many modern fields, market demand
drives design trends); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)
(remarking that the rapid advance of technology requires patent holders to be
aware of these conditions within the context of judicial standards); Hotchkiss
v. Greenwood 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850); Royal Typewriter Co. v.
Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1948) (describing the balance
between disclosure of the invention for gain to the inventor and the potential
for others to take advantage of the discovery without benefit to the original
inventor). For a parallel analysis in Canadian jurisprudence, see, e.g.,
Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, para. 37 (Can.)
(describing the bargain between patentee and the public, which requires
protection of the patent holder in exchange for the disclosure of the invention
with the agreement of the public to not allow an extension of the patent
beyond a certain term of years); Free World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc., [2000]
2 S.C.R. 1024, para. 13 (Can.) (“In return for disclosure of the invention to the
public, the inventor acquires for a limited time the exclusive right to exploit
it.”).
119. See generally Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra
note 12, at 176–83 (describing the development of linkage regulations in the
United States and Canada and product how the interaction of linkage law
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Product clusters are hypothesized to be comprised of an
expanding number of follow-on drugs evolving from a single
new and original drug, surrounded by a constellation of
patents, which interconnect products within a given cluster
through a combination of traditional infringement law and the
listing provision under emerging linkage law.120 These patents
serve two different yet vital functions. First, they provide
support for follow-on drug candidates via traditional
infringement law, and second they provide fodder for listing on
patent registers to delay generic entry under linkage law.
Perhaps most important for policy-makers may be the sum of
the interactions between multiple drugs and multiple patents
in these clusters that most effectively chills generic entry.
Given that empirical data are only beginning to be
reported on pharmaceutical linkage, this clustering effect may
present a more substantial barrier to generic entry than
previously recognized and it is not clear whether generics are
being adequately compensated for taking on the risk of
litigation.121 Our work thus far suggests this conclusion may
apply more strongly in jurisdictions where litigation under
linkage regulations does not constitute final decision, where
linkage laws do not provide generic entrants with an
with patent law and food and drug law may conduce to the development of
product clusters). For an articulation of the product cluster hypothesis, see
generally RON A. BOUCHARD, PATENTLY INNOVATIVE: HOW PHARMACEUTICAL
FIRMS USE EMERGING PATENT LAW TO EXTEND MONOPOLIES ON
BLOCKBUSTER DRUGS (BIOHEALTHCARE PUBLISHING SERIES ON PHARMA,
BIOTECH AND BIOSCIENCE: SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY) (FORTHCOMING 2011)
(Chapter 7 describes how linkage regulations have impacted the
pharmaceutical industry in recent years and provides a ‘path of least
resistance’ to the development of product clusters); Bouchard, I’m Still Your
Baby, supra note 5; Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra
note 12. The term “patent clusters” has been used by the E.C. in its
“Originator-Generic Competition” Fact Sheet accompanying the EC Sector
Pharmaceutical Sector Preliminary Report, where it was stated that a
common strategy employed by brand firms to maintain revenue streams from
blockbuster drugs for as long as possible is the creation of “patent clusters” by
the filing of numerous patents for the same medicine. As noted in the report,
evidence obtained by the Commission from inspections of originator companies
revealed that the objective of the clustering strategy was to delay or block the
market entry of generic medicines.
120. See supra note 119
121. Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc., [2010] 2 F.C.R. 389, para. 101–02 (Can.);
For a discussion of the issue of generic compensation, see generally Aiden
Hollis, Generic Drug Pricing and Procurement: A Policy for Alberta, SPS RES.
PAPERS
(Feb.
2009),
http://www.iapr.ca/files/iapr/Hollis%20on%20line%20final%20Feb%203.pdf.
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exclusivity period for first movers compared to those that do
not, where the relevance requirement for patent listing is
comparatively weak, where patents are comparatively easier to
obtain, where linkage law allows for settlements between brand
and generic firms to restrain competition in the 180 day first
mover period, and where the evidentiary standard for the
approval of new and follow-on drugs is comparatively low.
Evidence reviewed to this point suggests the Bolar
provision was narrowly intended to encourage generic entry.
Evidence that this narrow exception to patent law was
ultimately in service of a short-term exemption that favors, not
restricts, competition can be found in the words of the CEC to
whom the Hatch-Waxman bill was referred:
The purpose of sections 271(e)(1) and (2) is to establish that
experimentation with a patented drug product, when the purpose is
to prepare for commercial activity which will begin after a valid
patent expires, is not a patent infringement. . . . Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to grant exclusive
rights to an inventor for a limited time. That limited time should be a
definite time and, thereafter, immediate competition should be
encouraged. For that reason, Title I of the bill permits the filing of
abbreviated new drug applications before a patent expires and
contemplates that the effective approval date will be the expiration
date of the valid patent covering the original product. Other sections
of Title II permit the extension of the term of a patent for a definite
time provided certain conditions are met.122

According to this argument, evergreening123 of older
products via multiple patent listing is contrary to the objective
of Hatch-Waxman to facilitate generic entry via a short-term
suspension of patent infringement and competition.
The Committee on the Judiciary (COJ), to whom HatchWaxman was also referred, acknowledged that FDA rules
restricting generic entry prior to Hatch-Waxman “had serious
anti-competitive effects” and that the “net result of these rules
has been the practical extension of the monopoly position of the
patent holder beyond the expiration of the patent.”124 The COJ
went further as regards the multiple patent listing issue,
stating:
The first amendment rejected by the Committee was offered by Mr.
Hughes. The Hughes amendment would have permitted the granting

122. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45–46 (1984) (emphasis added).
123. See supra note 47.
124. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984).
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of a patent term extension for the substances regulated by the bill for
each regulatory review period. The net result of the amendment was to
permit multiple patent term extensions on what was essentially the
same drug product. This amendment was supported by the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO). The PTO argued that the version of
H.R. 3605 reported by the Committee on Energy and Commerce
would create two different types of patents for drugs; those which are
extendable and those which are not extendable. The latter category,
they claim, includes subsequent use, method and composition patents.
The Committee considered these arguments and rejected them for
two reasons. First, the Committee accepted the rationale put forward
by the Committee on Energy and Commerce concerning the need to
avoid multiple patent term extensions. Our sister Committee argued
that the only patented product which experiences any substantial
regulatory delay is the first product patent (or if there is no product
patent, the first process patent). Therefore, they reason that
subsequent patents on approved drug products are frequently not the
same magnitude of innovation as occurs with respect to the initial
patent. Thus, the Committee on Energy and Commerce concluded on
public policy and health policy grounds that only the first patent on a
drug-type product should be extended.125

In making these comments, the COJ stated in plain and
unambiguous terms that patent extension on weakly
innovative products was contrary to public policy and health
policy grounds.126 The specific mention of the “first product
patent” parallels comments made in the parliamentary debate
in Canada prior to linkage coming into force that generic entry
would occur on expiry of the “main patent” on a given
product,127 not on expiry of a cluster of patents. This statement
is coherent with that of the CEC to the effect that the
appropriate time for generic entry is the expiration date of the
valid patent (or patents) covering the original product and that
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments do not contemplate any other
method of extending patent term.128
Later in its report, the COJ was more explicit as to what
public policy grounds were involved, stating that early generic
availability would substantially “assist in the reduction of
health care costs. . . these reductions will be especially
important to the poor, the under-insured, and the elderly.”129
The government as a purchaser of prescription drugs was also
deemed to benefit substantially by the amendments. The COJ
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 7–8 (emphasis added).
Id.
See Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 50.
See supra text accompanying note 122.
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 25 (1984).
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also stipulated that given the regulatory nature of the industry
involved, early working allowing a shortening of the delay of
generic entry between eighteen and twenty-four months would
not unduly encroach on the patent rights of brand firms and
thus properly enhanced competition between brand and generic
firms.130 This is consistent with the statement of the Federal
Circuit in Mylan, to the effect that the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments were intended to balance two competing policy
goals and that this balancing function was achieved by
establishing a generic drug approval procedure at one end of
the balance and restoring patent terms for pioneer firms to
make up for lost time during the regulatory approval stage at
the other end.131 No mention was made of creating a second
back-end process for evergreening older drugs.
While it may not have been anticipated at the time linkage
came into force in either originating jurisdiction, and bearing in
mind the COJ’s statement that up to Bolar, Congress “has
never had occasion to evaluate the competing policy
considerations presented by this bill,”132 the empirical data that
have been reported in countries with longer standing linkage
regulations, such as the United States and Canada, suggest
that the multiple patent listing mechanism has grown to be
sufficiently unwieldy that the outputs of the system (delayed
generic entry and anti-competitive effects) maybe in increasing
conflict with the twin policy goals underpinning both Hatch
Waxman and the NOC Regulations. That is, that permitting
multiple patent listings on an array, or cluster, of related drug
products may yield a system which behaves in precisely the
same manner said by the COJ to offend public policy and
health policy grounds.133
There have been numerous suggestions in case law and
government reports that the multiple patent listing models was
adopted because food and drug agencies such as the FDA,
Health Canada, and others, did not, and indeed do not, have
the expertise to judge patent validity and/or infringement. This
130. Id. at 29 (1984) (“As a result . . . generic drugs will be able to be placed
on the market between 18 months and 2 years earlier than without this
provision.”).
131. Mylan Pharm. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984)) .
132. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 29 (1984).
133. See supra notes 124–130 and accompanying text.
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sentiment was echoed in the recent Bayer v. India decision.134
The court held that drug regulators were “plainly not equipped
to deal with issues concerning the validity of a patent” and that
to oblige regulators to do so would be inconsistent with their
mandate as regulators and the private law function of domestic
Indian patent legislation.135 Indeed, amendments linkage law
pertaining to patent listing in jurisdictions such as the United
States and Canada that have been interpreted by some to be
successful136 may be less so than recognized in the long run, if
only because they have been too far downstream to be truly
effective. In other words, the amendments have been aimed at
fixing automatic stay abuses even though the antecedent
problem that gives rise to these downstream abuses is that of
multiple patent listing, particularly in relation to product
clusters. As discussed above, this reasoning was employed in
Bayer to deny linkage of food and drug law to patent law
through the infringement section of India’s patent
legislation.137
A mechanism for oversight of patent listing that may be
both more efficient and more effective than policing by the
courts or drug regulators may be to create a separate
administrative body within the mandate of the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) to independently assess patents for
relevance to new and innovative drugs prior to listing, as occurs
in some jurisdictions with regards to drug price controls.
Similar arm’s length institutions have been created to police
134. Bayer Corporation & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. LPA 443/2009
(Dehli H.C.) (India), at para 28
135. Id.
136. See generally Epstein & Kuhlik , supra note 8, at 14 (arguing that the
gains from biomedical innovation outweigh the barriers presented by the
“anti-commons” and that Hatch Waxman has been a positive, rather than
negative, vehicle for development of the generic drug industry in the United
States). But see Avery, supra note 8, 196–200 (declaring the Medicare
Modernization Act, which was passed to alleviate the abuses of the HatchWaxman Act by pharmaceutical patent holders, had been unsuccessful in
achieving that goal); Hemphill and Lemley, supra note 13 (noting that Hatch
Waxman is not working as intended because pharmaceutical patent owners
have responded with a “sophisticated program of product “lifecycle
management,” which is code for finding ways to extend exclusivity as long as
possible”.).
137. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, LPA 443/2009, para. 22 (Delhi H.C.)
(India) (“In granting marketing approval to a patented drug, the D[rug]
C[ontroller] G[eneral of] I[ndia] is by no means itself infringing upon any
patent or abetting the infringement of any patent by the applicant in whose
favor the marketing approval is being granted.”) (alteration in original).
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drug prices in Canada (Patented Medicines Prices Review
Board, or PMPRB)138 and to facilitate translational research
and innovative drug development in the United States
(National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences),139 and
to guide the use of health technologies, clinical practices, and
health promotion based on considerations of efficacy and costeffectiveness in the United Kingdom (National Institute for
Clinical Excellent, or NICE).140
An alternative to an independent advisory board would be
to develop a qualitative innovation index for assessing the
social value of pharmaceutical products and related patents.
Where an index of this nature is grounded in regulatory
preferences for new and follow-on drugs expressed by
regulators themselves, it could be used to determine which
patents should be listed on the patent register.141 Such an
index might, to a significant degree, side-step some of the
criticism of regulatory agencies for lacking expertise as to
patent quality.142 This is because the selection at issue would
be grounded in regulatory preferences expressed by public
health agencies exercising their mandate to set the evidentiary
benchmarks relating to benefit versus risk, unmet medical
need or significant advance in therapeutic value. Decisions of
this nature, unlike those relative to patent validity, are within
the expertise and mandates of health agencies such as the
FDA, Health Canada, and the European Medicines Agency.
Finally, we note that there may be subtle but significant
cultural differences between jurisdictions as to the tendency of
both brand and generic firms to game the system and the
reaction of the public and government when the system is
138. PATENTED MEDICINE PRICES REVIEW BOARD (last visited April 18,
2011), http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/english/home.asp?x=1.
139. Gardiner Harris, A New Federal Research Center Will Help to Develop
Medicines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2011, at A1.
INST.
FOR
HEALTH
&
CLINICAL
EXCELLENCE,
140. NATI’L
http://www.nice.org.uk/ (last visited June 13, 2011).
141. Ron A. Bouchard, Qualifying Intellectual Property II: A Novel
Innovation Index for Pharmaceutical Products (unpublished manuscript) (on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1809817.
142. See, e.g., Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug:
Patent Submission and Listing Requirements and Application of 30-Month
Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New Drug Applications Certifying That a
Patent Claiming a Drug Is Invalid or Will Not Be Infringed, 68 Fed. Reg. ,
36,676, 36,683 (June 18, 2003).
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effectively gamed. Jurisdictions such as the United States that
are viewed by some to have more of an arm’s length relation
between government and industry and be comparatively more
litigious in seeking legal remedies,143 may exhibit faster and
more efficient adaptive responses than jurisdictions with more
cooperation between government and industry. As indicated by
the rapid and strong responses of nations such as India144 and
Australia145 to the push for linkage in those jurisdictions
compared to the more receptive responses of nations such as
Canada, Mexico, and South Korea, it is possible there are
significant cultural differences in the manner in which linkage
is accepted or refuted and, when it is accepted, the speed and
strength of adaptive responses by law-makers when the system
is acknowledged to list to one side and require correction. A
similar conclusion may be drawn with regard to the
comparative responses of the public and governments of the
United States and Canada in response to perceived abuses of
the automatic stay provision.
The goal of further research on original policy intent will
be to obtain empirical qualitative and quantitative data to
determine whether or not multiple patents listed per drug
provide the linchpin for a potential clustering effect of this
nature. As revealed by the recent E.C. Pharmaceutical Sector
Inquiry, the Bolar debate is far from over: some originator
firms are claiming that by permitting marketing authorization
before a patent dispute has been settled, “the authorities
willingly collude in the alleged patent infringement”.146 The
143. Wiktorowicz, supra note 30, at 643 (describing the conflict resolution
process between industry and the government in the United States as
involving public hearings and redress through the courts and how this differs
from the degree of public-private partnership between government and
industry in Canada, the United Kingdom and France).
144. See infra text accompanying notes 173–180
145. See infra text accompanying notes 164–165.
146. Final Report, supra note 22, at 315.
Certain originator companies allege that by granting marketing
authorisation, the authorities willingly collude in the alleged
infringement. These originator companies therefore argue that no
marketing authorisation should be granted until the allegation of
patent infringement has been settled. Occasionally, actions are
accompanied by a threat to sue the marketing authorisation body for
damages if marketing authorisation is granted.”
Id.
As long as these activities are strictly necessary to prepare for an MA
application, they are not deemed to infringe patents rights … for
medicinal products in view of the so-called Bolar provision. This

01 BOUCHARD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

434

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

8/1/2011 1:37 PM

[Vol. 12:2

argument is not persuasive, but nonetheless may carry weight
with some regulators.

B. LEGAL CHECKS AND BALANCES
In addition to identifying the original policy intent for
linkage, it is also important to map the system of legal checks
and balances in different linkage regimes and investigate how
they operate together to determine the outputs of the system.
The specific basket of checks and balances in a given linkage
regime is vital, as it determines not only how a complex system
of pharmaceutical regulation begins operating de novo
following the coming into force of law but also how it evolves
over time to yield demonstrable empirical results. It has been
shown, for example, that the behavior of dynamic legal
systems,147 including how systems learn, self-regulate, adapt
and grow,148 is strongly influenced by positive and negative
feedback.149 Positive feedback results in growth or
amplification of a particular process or group of related
processes whereas negative feedback results in tamping or
slowing of a particular process or group of processes. Studies of
complex social, biological, and technological systems have
shown that the unintended consequences resulting from
feedback have the potential to force a system away from
operating at or near the point of efficiency.150
provision, which was introduced by Directive 2004/27, creates a safe
harbour for certain tests and studies while the reference product is
still patent-protected so as to enable the generic producer to apply for
marketing authorisation once the eight-year period of data exclusivity
granted to the holder of the original MA has elapsed.
Preliminary Report, supra note 22, at 260.
147. Cf. JERVIS, supra note 38 (discussing complexity in political and social
spheres); Harrison, supra note 9, at 473–77 (describing the complex adaptive
and dynamic nature of world politics).
148. Cf. Ruhl 2005, supra note 42, at 34–39 (addressing environmental
regulation and arguing that adaptive management regulation is the only way
to successfully address present and future legal, environmental problems). See
generally J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe
the Evolution of Law and Society and its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49
VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996) (utilizing Complexity Theory, a study in the change
of dynamical systems, to examine how the law unfolds).
149. See generally note 43 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Robert M. May et al., Complex Systems: Ecology for Bankers,
451 NATURE 893 (2008) (comparing the financial system to complex adaptive
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In the case of linkage regulations, unchecked feedback
could yield an array of results that move the system away from
its intended consequences. For example, even though the
original policy intent was to balance production of new and
innovative drugs with timely generic entry, a poorly operating
system could yield a decline in innovative products despite
strong patent protection; substantial delays in generic entry
despite abbreviated procedures for approval; increased
monopoly pricing despite incentives for innovation; wasteful
litigation despite abbreviated approval and litigation processes;
and increased, rather than decreased, public health costs.
Results such as these could be the consequence of a system
with insufficient checks and balances that is driven to certain
outputs much like damage to one wheel forces a car to
inevitably list to one side.
An example of feedback with unintended consequences is
provided for by the automatic stay, which is a fundamental
feature of pharmaceutical linkage. Studies in both North
America jurisdictions where linkage originally came into force
have demonstrated that that the likelihood of further patent
listing and litigation on high value drugs increases
substantially when a brand firm experiences success with its
first stay.151 Given the automatic nature of the injunction,
generics can be kept off market with comparatively less risk to

ecosystems and noting the need to identify conditions that make dynamic
systems unstable). For a look at the role of feedback in policy failure, see
generally JERVIS, supra note 38 (complex political systems); Ron A. Bouchard,
Reflections on the Value of Systems Models for Regulation of Medical Research
and Product Development, 17 HEALTH L. REV. 28 (2008) (discussing the
purposive systems-based policy development process in the health law area);
Ron A. Bouchard, KSR v. Teleflex Part 2: Impact of U.S. Supreme Court Patent
Law on Canadian and Global Systems-Based Innovation Ecologies, 15 HEALTH
L. J. 247 (2008) (discussing the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
KSR v. Teleflex on global innovation ecologies through the conceptual
framework of complex adaptive systems); Bozeman, supra note 38 (efficient
markets); Bozeman & Sarewitz, supra note 38 (science policy); Harrison, supra
note 9 (complexity in international politics); Sterman, supra note 38
(reflections on the development and utility of systems science and discussing
the claim that as a result of fundamental uncertainty “all models are wrong”).
151. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 11, at 13–21 (studying the
litigation tendencies of brand-name companies taking action against generic
companies in the first and second instances of alleged infringement); HORE,
PATENTLY ABSURD, supra note 26, at 6–9 (noting that Canada’s patent
regulations tie up generic manufacturers in litigation thus delaying entry of
generic drugs).
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brand firms.152 As noted by the Federal Court of Canada, which
exclusively hears patent matters under the NOC Regulations,
“by merely commencing the proceeding, the applicant obtains
what is tantamount to an interlocutory injunction for up to 30
months without having satisfied any of the criteria a court
would require before enjoining issuance of an NOC.”153 As
widely noted, governments in both the United States and
Canada have had to step in to amend their respective linkage
regimes in order to curb various abuses of the automatic stay
provision.
The delay of generic entry owing to abuses of the automatic
stay is just one example of unintended consequences of
legislation that occur as a result of adaptation by firms as they
gain experience with the system of legal checks and balances
that comprise a particular linkage regime. Our work has
identified a number of differences in the system of checks and
balances employed by different jurisdictions. It also suggests
that feedback between these mechanisms can strongly
influence the output of the system on brand and generic drug
availability and costs. For example, the U.S. Hatch-Waxman
regime provides generic firms with the opportunity to earlywork an invention without infringing brand patents (Bolar) as
well as to indirectly rely on the data in the branded company’s
application to support a generic company’s application for
approval.154 These benefits are balanced, however, by the
automatic stay of thirty months in favor of brand firms, which
can be shortened or lengthened at the discretion of a court.155 A

152. In the United States, the risk is also minimized for generics, who can
resolve patent issues without risking damages incurred in marketing the drug
and then being sued for infringement. This is not the case in Canada, as
proceedings under linkage laws are summary in nature and can, and often
are, followed by full infringement proceedings. A recent study of litigation in
the European Union revealed that even when disputes are few in number,
they exert a strong chilling effect on generic entry as a result of the mere risk
of interim injunctions. Final Report, supra note 22, at 200. The data showed
that over half of proceedings against generics were preceded by prior disputes,
leading the authors to conclude the chilling effect of even a small number of
proceedings “illustrates the strength of the link between patent-related
exchanges and patent litigation.” Id. at 209.
153. Bayer AG v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare), [1993]
51 C.P.R. (3d) 329, para.13 (Can.).
154. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 355 (2006).
155. Id.
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court’s early determination of patent invalidity or noninfringement will necessarily cut the thirty month period short.
On a secondary level, the thirty month stay preventing generics
from entering the market is balanced by 180 day period of
marketing exclusivity for the first entrant156 where generic
prices could escalate in absence of further generic competition.
The intent of this 180 day exclusivity period is to provide an
incentive to challenge patents.157 This series of legal checks and
balances should in theory minimize strong positive feedback in
favor of either brand or generic firms, and works towards
balancing the interests of both parties as well as the competing
policy goals involved.158 In practice there has been significant
gaming of the automatic stay which has led to frequent
settlements between generics and brands, and frequent
amendment of linkage laws.159
Unlike the United States, Canada had a significant generic
industry prior to the linkage regime. Repeal of compulsory
licensing and the coming into force of the NOC Regulations was
also intended to balance the competing interests of brand and
generic drugs and to effect cost savings for consumers.160 As in
the United States, both a Bolar provision and thirty month stay
(now reduced to twenty-four months) were provided under the
linkage regime.161 However, unlike the United States, the
automatic stay in Canada was not balanced by any exclusivity
period for generics, and the incentives for generic entry are
comparatively weak.162 At the same time, generic firms are
limited in the damages they can collect if they are excluded
from the market on the basis of brand litigation on an invalid
patent.163 Moreover, unlike the U.S. regime, proceedings under
156. Id.
157. See generally Mossinghoff, supra note 8, at 188–89 (chronicling the
legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act including the rationale behind its
passage).
158. Id.
159. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 11, at ii–xi (recommending fixes
to alleviate the gaming by the pharmaceutical industry); see also FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 4–6 (2010) (noting findings of the FTC that numerous
final agreements delayed generic entry).
160. See supra note 5.
161. Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/1993133 (Can.).
162. See Hollis, supra note 121, at 34.
163. See Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc., [2010] 2 F.C.R. 389 (Can.); Apotex Inc.
v. Merck & Co., [2009] 3 F.C.R. 234 (Can.).
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the NOC Regulations are summary in nature and do not
constitute a final decision on issues of validity or infringement.
Thus, even under circumstances where a generic has obtained a
finding of invalidity or non-infringement on all relevant listed
patents, it is still vulnerable to a traditional infringement
action on the exact same patents. By contrast, the provision for
generics to challenge patents prior to marketing and to
eliminate the threat of infringement is a prime mechanism by
which the U.S. Hatch-Waxman regime is seen to foster generic
entry. Were it not for the combination of both mechanisms,
linkage would operate only as a type of advisory option given
the vulnerability of generic firms to double-jeopardy type
litigation. Therefore, unlike the U.S. regulations, the specific
system of legal checks and balances inherent to the Canadian
linkage system may provide for greater legal uncertainty and,
unintentionally, favor brand pharmaceutical firms.164
Australia, by contrast, seems to have learned and adapted
well from these experiences. Australian trade negotiators, for
example, included in the domestic linkage regime specific
provisions against evergreening and a provision for evidencebased assessment of pharmaceutical innovation despite
opposition from American negotiators.165 Analogous to the U.S.
regime, this provision has been balanced by more recent
changes to domestic formulary law mandating price controls for
generic drugs under certain circumstances. Similar to
Australia, India’s patent legislation also contains an express
provision against evergreening, which has been challenged
unsuccessfully by brand firms as being non-compliant with
TRIPS.166 Thus, it can be seen that different legal mechanisms
(structure) can impact substantially on the outputs of the
linkage system (function) in different jurisdictions.

164. See Hollis, supra note 121, at 8–10.
165. Thomas Faunce et al., Assessing the Impact of the Australia-United
States Free Trade Agreement on Australian and global Medicines Policy,
&
HEALTH
(Oct.
6,
2005),
GLOBALIZATION
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/1/1/15.
India’s
patent
legislation also contains a provision against evergreening, which has been
challenged unsuccessfully by brand firms as being non-compliant with TRIPS.
Indian Patents Act, No. 39, Section 3(d) of 1970, INDIA CODE (1970). For a
description of Indian patent law in the context of pharmaceuticals, see
generally FEROZ ALI KHADER, THE LAW OF PATENTS—WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS
ON PHARMACEUTICALS IN INDIA (2007).
166. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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Jurisdictions that are contemplating bringing in some form of
linkage in the future would do well to heed the lessons learned
by jurisdictions with older forms of linkage.
C. CONVERGENCE OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ECONOMIC POLICY
The original policy intent to balance the competing goals of
stimulating pioneering innovation and facilitating generic
entry through the same legal nexus necessarily implies a
certain degree of policy disharmony. The first of these goals is
aimed primarily at private gain while the other is to benefit the
public in the form of lower government expenditures and/or
lower costs to consumers. While in practice both brand and
generic firms seek to increase market share for their own ends,
the goal of cost savings renders increased generic availability
an important public health issue.167 This has not gone
unnoticed by the Supreme Court of Canada in its assessment of
the nation’s linkage regime.168 Similar observations have been
made by the U.S. Supreme Court.169 It is clear in both
jurisdictions that convergence of public health and economic
policy has been embraced, however reluctantly, in the form of
the linkage regime as well as other legislation relating to
prioritization and commercialization of publicly funded medical
research.170 For example, in AstraZeneca v. Canada, the
Supreme Court of Canada recently held that pharmaceutical
linkage lies “at the intersection of two regulatory systems with
sometimes conflicting objectives.”171 Whereas food and drug
law seeking to ensure the safety and efficacy of new
medications before they can be put on the market, patent law
provides private inventors with exclusive right to exploit their
invention for a period equal to the patent term. Regarding the
convergence of public health and economic, or industrial, law,

167. See COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN CANADA, BUILDING
VALUES: THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN CANADA 189–91 (2002). Senator
Hatch, at the time the Hatch-Waxman Act came into force, said “[t]he public
receives the best of both worlds—cheaper drugs today and better drugs
tomorrow.” Epstein & Kuhlik, supra note 8, at 11.
168. AstraZeneca Can. Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] S.C.R.
560 (Can.); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1
S.C.R. 533 (Can.); Merck Frosst Can. Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National
Health and Welfare), [1998] 2 S.C.R 193 (Can.).
169. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676–79 (1990).
170. KRIMSKY, supra note 3, at 177–82; see supra Figure 1.
171. AstraZeneca Can. Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] S.C.R.
560, at para. 12 (Can).
ON
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the court noted that until linkage came into force the two
regulatory systems were largely kept “distinct and separate.”172
Other jurisdictions, however, have not heeded the siren
call of convergence. For example, in the recent High Court of
Delhi Bayer decision, the court rejected linkage specifically on
the grounds of convergence.173 Justice Muralidhar, speaking for
the Court, stated that the legislative schemes for patent law
and drug approval are “distinct and separate” and that the
attempt to establish a linkage between the two cannot be
countenanced.174 The court noted that in granting approval for
generic equivalents, drug regulators neither per se infringe the
patent rights of brand firms nor abet the infringement of such
rights by generic firms simply because the drug is patented.175
In rendering its decision, the court noted that given the
presumption of validity for patents associated with the drug for
which marketing approval is sought, linkage would improperly
oblige drug regulators to enforce the rights of owners under
patent legislation, which is not the function of the regulator.176
The court held that such action was in the private law domain,
and that when a private right is conferred by a statute such as
under domestic patent legislation, the proper remedy for an
infringement of that right must be in terms of that statute and
no other.177 The court noted that the expectation is that the
172. Id.
173. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, LPA 443/2009 (Delhi H.C.) (India).
174. Id. para. 28. Justice Muralidhar stated
This Court concurs with the learned Single Judge that the scheme of
both the Patents Act and the DCA are distinct and separate and that
the attempt by the appellant Bayer to establish a linkage cannot be
countenanced. . . . What Bayer wants the DCGI to do is to enforce its
rights as a patent holder in terms of Section 48 of the Patents Act.
That is plainly not the function of the DCGI. His powers and
jurisdiction are circumscribed by the DCA and not the Patents Act. It
is entirely up to the patent holder to seek whatever remedies are
available to it to enforce and protect its patent from infringement.
This is in the private law domain. The DCA has nothing to do with it.
There is merit in the contention that when a private right is conferred
by a statute, the remedy for an infringement of that right has to be in
terms of that statute and no other.
Id. The court further stated “[t]he expectation is that the patent holder will
institute appropriate proceedings during the “monopoly” period to safeguard
its rights in terms of Section 48 of the Patents Act. It does not require the
DCGI’s help in this.” Id. para. 29.
175. Id. at para 22, 25.
176. Id. at para 28
177. Id.
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patent holder will institute appropriate infringement
proceedings under patent law when it deems its rights to be
infringed, and that patentees do not require the help of drug
regulators to do so.178 For these reasons, pharmaceutical
linkage was held to contravene the government’s interest in
public health by rendering patented drugs unaffordable and
non-accessible.179 Bayer appealed to the Supreme Court of
India, which dismissed Bayer’s appeal based on its finding that
the decision of the High Court of Delhi was well-reasoned and
without error.180
While one can look at India primarily as a jurisdiction with
strong generic interests, the same cannot be said of the
European Union, where many global pharmaceutical firms are
based. In its 2009 Final Report of the Pharmaceutical Sector
Inquiry, the E.C. stipulated that under E.U. law regulatory
approval is not linked to patent status, nor can the same be
used to “refuse, suspend or revoke marketing authorisation.”181
Echoing the decision of the High Court of Delhi in Bayer, the
Commission specified that
The task of marketing authorisation bodies is to verify whether a
medicinal product is safe, effective and of good quality. Their main
function is to ensure that the pharmaceutical products reaching the
market are not harmful to public health. Other factors, such as the
patent status of the product, should therefore not be taken into
account when assessing the risk/benefit balance of a medicine.182

Of interest, while some jurisdictions have vetted the
convergence of food and drug law and patent and industrial law
178. Id.
179. Id. para. 30.
180. Bayer Corporation v. Union of India, SLP 6540/2010 (Ind.).
181. See Final Report, supra note 22, at 315 n.514:
Article 81 of Regulation (EC) 726/2004 and Article 126 of Directive
(EC) 2001/83 provide that an authorisation to market a medicinal
product shall not be refused, suspended or revoked except on the
grounds set out in the Regulation and the Directive. Considering that
patent status is not included in the grounds set out in the Regulation
and the Directive, it cannot be used as an argument to refuse,
suspend or revoke a marketing authorisation. The Commission may
launch infringement proceedings against any Member State which
infringes the Directive.
Similarly, in South Korea, the drug approval authority does not take into
account the patent status on the ground that the drug approval authority is
not competent to do so. Pharmaceutical Affairs Law Enforcement Regulations,
Health and Welfare Ordinace No. 32, art. 43(7) (Dec. 30, 2010) (S. Kor.). Only
when a court confirms a patent infringement is the drug approval cancelled ex
post. See id.
182. Preliminary Report, supra note 22, at 261.
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(United States, Canada, Mexico, and Australia) and others
have rejected it (European Union, India), some jurisdictions
seem to be trying to juggle both ends of the balance in order to
gain a measure of linkage without explicit law. For example, as
noted above pharmaceutical linkage is not the law of the
European Union. However, in its report, the E.C. noted that
several jurisdictions had nevertheless attempted to implement
some form of linkage, including Hungary, Portugal, the Slovak
Republic, and Italy.183
The Mexican Supreme Court recently held that the main
function of pharmaceutical linkage is explicitly to provide the
legal grounds for the regulatory authority to reject marketing
authorizations that are deemed to violate patent rights.184 The
court held that the purpose of listing patents on the patent
register is to establish a link between the grant of marketing
authorization by health the authorities and industrial property
authorities that are in charge of granting and protecting patent
rights for the exclusive use of inventions.185 The court went one
step further, clarifying that under such linkage it is the proper
job of the regulatory authority to reject marketing
authorizations which violate the rights derived from relevant
patents.186 As such, the Mexican Supreme Court has clearly
embraced the convergence of public health and industrialeconomic policy.
From the discussion thus far, it can be seen that different
jurisdictions have grappled with the issue of the convergence
and/or divergence of health policy and industrial and economic
policy with significantly differentiated outcomes. More research
is necessary to parse out in detail the differing policy grounds,
public policy values, free trade agreement power imbalances,
and legislative debates preceding linkage in these jurisdictions
in order to arrive at whatever unified rules may be at play in
these divergence outcomes, if any.
183. See Final Report, supra note 22, at 316 tbl. 24.
184. Mexican Supreme Court Decides on Broad Interpretation of Linkage
DOCS
(Mar.
9,
2010,
11:43
PM),
Regulations,
PATENT
http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/03/mexican-supreme-court-decides-on-broadinterpretation-of-linkage-regulations.html.
185. See Alejandro Luna, Supreme Court upholds the worth of formulation
&
CIA,
patents,
OLIVARES
http://www.olivares.com.mx/Knowledge/Articles/IPLitigationArticles/Supreme
Courtupholdstheworthofformulationpatents (last visited June 13, 2011).
186. Id.
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D. EXPANSION OF LINKAGE BEYOND THE DRUG APPROVAL-DRUG
PATENTING NEXUS
There is growing recognition that the system of
pharmaceutical linkage regulation is aggressively expanding
not only geographically,187 but also in scope.188 This expansion
has the potential to significantly impact domestic systems of
intellectual property, but may also strongly influence the
movement of drugs intended for humanitarian purposes
between nations. As such, it is possible that linkage between
market authorization and drug patenting may be providing an
important legal template for expansion of linkage into other
realms involving pharmaceutical products.
The recent E.C. Report of the Pharmaceutical Sector
Inquiry is a case in point.189 The report represents the first
clear articulation of policy reasons for opposition to linkage
from a major economic region.190 It also clearly outlines an
expansive legal concept of pharmaceutical linkage. The
Preliminary Report, issued in November 2008, provided a list of
existing and emerging patent linkages inherent to what the
Sector Inquiry described as a “tool-box of instruments and
measures for how to prepare for and react to generic entry.”191
The tool-box described by the E.C. focuses on the concept of
pharmaceutical linkage. The range of described linkage
practices encompassed the linkage of patent status not only to
market authorization, but also to: contracts, disputes, and
litigations between originator and generic companies;
opposition procedures and appeals before patent offices; patent
settlements and other agreements between originator and
generic companies; promotional activities, including an

187. See Correa, supra note 14, at 401 (explaining that U.S. Free Trade
Agreements require a linkage between drug market authorization and
patents).
188. See Final Report, supra note 22, at 131.
189. Id. at 480 (“The Commission will continue to strictly enforce the
applicable Community law and, for instance, act against patent linkage, as
according to Community legislation, marketing authorisation bodies cannot
take the patent status of the originator medicine into account when deciding
on marketing authorisations of generic medicines.”). In the Preliminary
Report, the E.C. stated more specifically that Patent-linkage is considered
unlawful under Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 and Directive (EC) No 2001/83.
Preliminary Report, supra note 22, at 15. For further elaboration, see
discussion supra note 35.
190. See Final Report, supra note 22.
191. Preliminary Report, supra note 22, at 22.
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emphasis on follow-on and other second generation products; as
well as a range of interventions by brand firms before national
authorities pertaining to marketing authorization, drug
pricing, and reimbursement.192
An evolving landscape such as this raises the question of
whether the pharmaceutical industry is using linkage as an
expansive legal and public policy tool to reach across national
borders. Further research is necessary to elucidate the grounds
and potential impact of this claim, both nationally and globally.
E. RIGHTS LAYERING V. SINGLE POINT MECHANISM FOR
INCENTING INNOVATION
Emerging empirical data on incremental innovation and
linkage regulations,193 particularly when taken in combination
with
historical
studies
of
patent
protection
for
have
demonstrated
a
growing
pharmaceuticals,194
sophistication in the ability of pharmaceutical firms to layer
patent and other intellectual property rights on pharmaceutical
products at numerous stages of drug development. When
combined with conventional patent law and the evidentiary
requirements for new and follow-on drug approval, linkage
regimes appear to provide a powerful tool for multinational
pharmaceutical firms to efficiently and effectively identify
attractive new and follow-on drug candidates for prolonged
market exclusivity at various stages of the product lifecycle.
The linkage regime in particular has proven to be a
valuable tool for firms to obtain enhanced legal protection on
drugs at all stages of development, including drugs about to
192. See discussion supra note 36.
193. See BENGT DOMEIJ, PHARMECUTICAL PATENTS IN EUROPE (2000)
(noting the linkage between the pharmaceutical industry and patent
legislation in Europe and how European patent law allows the exclusion of
competition for products on a fixed time scale); Bengt Domeij, Initial and
Follow-on Pharmaceutical Inventions in Europe, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 177–98 (Ove Granstrand, ed., 2003) (examining
court decisions in Europe and identifying ways in which courts can create
extra incentives for valuable follow-on inventions); Bouchard & Sawicka,
supra note 110, at 57–58; see generally Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom?,
supra note 12, at 1509–21 (discussing the impact of linkage and other
regulations on drug creation); Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting,
supra note 12, at 189–216; Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 13; Hemphill &
Sampat, supra note 13.
194. See generally BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3; BOLDRIN & LEVINE,
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY, supra note 3.
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come off patent protection, drugs moving through the
regulatory approval stage, and drugs that are currently in
development.195 The number and array of patent types, the
speed of patent listing, the automatic injunction, and the low
relevance requirement for listing combined with low
evidentiary requirements for new and follow-on drug approval
enable pharmaceutical firms to rapidly identify attractive drug
targets for legal protection both during and after regulatory
approval. Added to patent linkage is the data exclusivity
regime which, depending on the country being considered, now
provides for up to 11.5 years of market exclusivity for products
based on the confidentiality of regulatory submission data.196
When gauged against reports indicting declining levels of
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry,197 be it from a loss
of low hanging fruit,198 increasing research and development
costs,199 or firms aiming ex ante at legal targets offering high
reward for low risk drug development,200 the question arises of
whether numerous layers of intellectual property protection,
and the corresponding extension of market exclusivity, are

195. Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra note 12 at 181–
82.
196. Alexander Stack, Canada: Trade-Driven Changes Coming to
Canadian Patent and Data Protection Laws? Canada-European Union Trade
(Jan.
11,
2011),
Negotiations,
MONDAQ
http://www.mondaq.com/canada/article.asp?articleid=106048.
197. See, e.g., BRIAN GUTHRIE & TREFOR MUNN-VENN, CONFERENCE BD.
OF CANADA, SIX QUICK HITS FOR CANADIAN COMMERCIALIZATION 1 (Apr.
2005),
available
at,
http://www.angelinvestor.ca/userfiles/file/IPTC/Supporting%20Docs%20for%20
IPTC/IPTC%20Conf%20Brd%206%20Quick%20Hits.pdf;
Reinventing
Innovation and Commercialization Policy in Ontario 44 (Inst. for
Competitiveness & Prosperity, Working Paper No. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.competeprosper.ca/images/uploads/wp06.pdf.
For a discussion of the decline in innovation in the broader sciences, see
generally EXPERT PANEL, supra note 58; COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS,
INNOVATE
AMERICA
22–25
(2005),
available
at
http://www.compete.org/images/uploads/File/PDF%20Files/NII_Innovate_Ame
rica.pdf; COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, FIVE FOR THE FUTURE 18 (2007),
available
at
http://www.compete.org/images/uploads/File/PDF%20Files/Five_Final_8858C
OC.pdf.
198. Fredric J. Cohen, Macro Trends in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 4
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 78, 82 (2005), available at
http://www.nature.com/nrd/journal/v4/n1/pdf/nrd1610.pdf.
199. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of
Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 158 (2003).
200. See Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom?, supra note 12, at 1509–13.
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encouraging or stifling innovation in the pharmaceutical
sector.201
It may be that one, not both, mechanisms for protecting
innovative drugs will prevail in the long run. For example, in
its review of patent term extension under Hatch-Waxman, the
U.S. Congressional Budget Office noted that shortening of drug
review times may be a more effective means of stimulating
innovative research rather than further lengthening patent
protection since millions of dollars in sales are lost for each
extra day a drug stays in the approval process.202
Given that regulatory review times have declined
substantially over the last two decades globally in the context
of user fees,203 one could ask what is the public interest in
expanding patent terms via the linkage regime either alone or
concomitant with data exclusivity and patent term restoration?
Is it in the public interest to continue to link drug approval
with patent protection to produce multiple layers of exclusivity
protection? Does the convergence mechanism hold up if the
economic goals of linkage are not being met?
These questions are vital from a public health perspective,
as the growing data exclusivity regime is a nearly perfect
substitute for patent linkage. How a given nation addresses
each will impact generic entry and thus cost savings and access
to essential medications.
F. ROLE OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS
Finally, there is the thorny issue of the relevance of
empirical research on pharmaceutical patents for the making of
law and policy ex ante as well as its ex post review. At this point
in time, we are witnessing an influx of highly qualified
personnel into the field of law with previous experience in the
hard empirical sciences, particularly the medical sciences.
Unlike schools of medicine, management, and business at the

201. See generally Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra
note 12, at 181–82 (discussing the impact patents and linkage regulations
have on the activities of pharmaceutical companies in terms of their tendency
to produce new versus follow-on drugs).
202. Glasgow, supra note 25, at 256–57.
203. For relevant information regarding review times, see generally Joel
Lexchin, Commentary, Drug Withdrawals from the Canadian Market for
Safety Reasons, 1963-2004, 172 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 765, 772 (2005), available
at http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/reprint/172/6/765.
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end of the first decade of the twenty-second century, schools of
law, legal systems, and the judiciary are just beginning to
realize the full potential of empirical legal research to
contribute to law-making and law reform in areas of law that
are heavily contingent on science.
Indeed, there is a growing discordance between the policy
grounds underpinning the pharmaceutical linkage and the
results of empirical studies intended to assess their
effectiveness, as well as that of the patent system more
generally in providing incentives for innovation. As noted
above, the goal of the linkage regime is often cited as balancing
the conflicting policy goals of facilitating the development of
new and innovative drugs and timely generic entry. Yet a
number of studies have been published recently that report
largely negative results on the impact of linkage regulations on
the approval of new drugs, the timeliness of generic entry, and
the extension of market exclusivity on blockbuster products
coming off patent due solely to linkage.204
The results of empirical studies such as these have
profound ramifications for assessing how well the linkage
regime works as currently constituted and thus enables
conclusions as to the vires of legislation when gauged against
its original policy goals. It has been demonstrated, for example,
that loopholes in linkage laws, as they operate in tandem with
low evidentiary requirements for drug approval, can provide for
clustering of follow-on drugs and related patents, and that
these clusters of drugs and patents can substantially extend
the cumulative patent life of older blockbuster drugs by as
much as a factor of two.205
Even when considering only the extension of market
exclusivity—when all relevant patents listed on the patent
register have been litigated and found to be invalid or not
infringed—linkage still delays generic entry by three to five
years.206 This can be compared to the seven month (weighted
average) delay for generic entry following the loss of patent
protection in the European Union in the absence of linkage.207
The E.C. Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry recently found that

204. For a review of these studies, see Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra
note 5, at 77–94.
205. Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom?, supra note 12, at 1497–94.
206. See id. at 1505–06
207. Final Report, supra note 22, at 8.
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over the period studied, savings from generic entry of
medications would have been twenty percent greater if entry
had taken place immediately following the loss of brand
exclusivity.208 Thus, the lag between the loss of brand
exclusivity and generic entry, and the contribution thereto by
linkage laws, is critical for public health savings from a
qualitative as well as quantitative perspective.
In addition to obtaining data pertaining to drug approval,
litigation and innovation, it is necessary to investigate the
relationship of this data to those for sales and profit data before
and after linkage regulations came into force, the fractional
cost of generics at different points in the product lifecycle
compared to brand products across jurisdictions, as well as how
linkage regulations in different jurisdictions determine the
duration of market exclusivities and their impact on the price
of brand and generic drugs, particularly before and after
litigation under various linkage provisions has terminated. The
growing cache of empirical data on pharmaceutical linkage may
be of increasing importance as numerous jurisdictions
worldwide are in the process of revising, rejecting or enacting
pharmaceutical linkage regulations. Empirical evidence as to
the successes and failures of different forms of linkage would
therefore be valuable, both domestically and globally.
Discordance between claims for pharmaceutical linkage
and the so-called “real world” effects of linkage on drug
development are not new. For example, in the political debate
leading up to repeal of compulsory licensing and the coming
into force of the Canadian regulations, an evidence-based
approach to drug patenting and pharmaceutical linkage was
explicitly rejected by Parliament.209 During the hearings, a
U.S.-based economist specializing in drug development gave
evidence as to the importance of empirical studies when
assessing linkage regulations, suggesting that a HatchWaxman-like linkage regime would enhance market exclusivity
for blockbuster drugs several-fold more than anticipated to the
detriment of payers in the absence of demonstrable increases in
national research and development capacity.210 The evidence
demonstrated that multiple patents per drug would be affected

208. Id. at 9.
209. See Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 102 n.53.
210. Id. at 104–05.
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and that the average delay for generic entry would be on the
order of ten to fifteen years.211 The data were discounted in
favor of the unsupported claim that only one patent per drug
would be affected, the average delay in generic entry would be
minimal, and the tacit assumption that increased patent
protection would yield both increased innovation and public
welfare.212 There appeared to be no middle ground during the
negotiations or a reasonable appreciation for the value of
empirical data to the debate.213 A similar situation evolved in
the United States following the enactment of Hatch-Waxman,
which was addressed in subsequent amendments to the
legislation.214
Data from our early work on global pharmaceutical linkage
indicate that the debate over the value of empirical data for
law-making relative to linkage regulations is far from over and
indeed may be taking on new relevance. Jurisdictions that were
not ready to address what may have been seen as an isolated
study during the original debates over linkage 215 are now faced
with mounting empirical work on pharmaceuticals and
211. Id. at 105; Tancer, supra note 9, at 294.
212. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 104.
213. See id. at 102 n.53.
214. Epstein & Kuhlik, supra note 8, at 14 n.29; Avery, supra note 8, at
184–87. It was recognized as early as 2001 that pharmaceutical patent
reforms such as linkage regulations could extend the average patent life of
pharmaceuticals by at least fifty percent. Glasgow, supra note 25, at 233. In
its 2002 report, the FTC reported that approximately twenty-eight percent
and thirty-five percent of patents were either invalid or uninfringed,
respectively, suggesting that undue prolongation of patent monopolies under
Hatch-Waxman Act constituted abuses of linkage law. See FED. TRADE
COMM’N, supra note 11, at 20. Four years later, the U.S. Congressional Budget
Office noted that the number of new pharmaceutical products was declining.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY
(2006),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf. This decrease
came even as patent protection for pharmaceuticals had escalated. Jaffe,
supra note 3, at 531. Results such as these prompted Kesselheim & Avorn to
note in 2006 that legal exclusivity periods in the pharmaceutical sector had
already produced a wide range of negative effects on public health, including
making essential medications unaffordable to developing nations, preventing
dissemination of patented processes for vitamin fortification to underserved
populations, limiting the ability of nations to manage epidemics, releasing new
drugs only as combination therapies to avoid generic entry, and the inflation
of drug prices. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Biomedical Patents
and the Public’s Health: Is There a Role for Eminent Domain?, 295 JAMA 434,
434 (2006).
215. For a review of interpretation of Dr. Schondenmeyer’s data in the
Canadian context, see Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 104–05.
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patents,216 including linkage.217 A second conclusion is that
jurisdictions outside North America appear to have taken
lessons from those with previous experience more seriously in
bringing in or rejecting domestic versions of linkage. An
important issue to explore in future research on topic is what
factors were seen by various jurisdictions as more or less
important in their policy deliberations and what the likely
reasons were for others to ignore these lessons. Moreover,
learning what lessons were drawn from studies of the outputs
from different systems of checks and balances in various
jurisdictions, and how did these lessons inform the
customization of pharmaceutical linkage in various
jurisdictions will be important to understand.
Consider, for example, the comparative linkage experience
in the European Union, Australia and South Korea. Studies
conducted by Australian and European Union governments,
demonstrated significant learning from experience and strong
adaptation. Data obtained by the European Union was broad in
scope, depth, and balance of analysis, and thus well informed
linkage policy and law.218 Similarly, after intense deliberation
and public debate,219 Australia introduced both express antievergreening provisions (involving damages and penalties) as
well as a provision for pharmaceutical innovation to be defined
based on considerations of “objectively demonstrated
therapeutic significance” in its linkage regime, notwithstanding
significant resistance from U.S. trade negotiators.220 It remains
to be seen whether this customized system of checks and
balances will yield an empirically observable balance between
the production of new and innovative drugs and timely generic
entry.

216. E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 88–91; BOLDRIN & LEVINE,
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY, supra note 3, at 212–38; see also ADAM B. JAFFE &
JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT
SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 11–12 (2004).
217. A number of papers are dedicated to reviewing the various studies on
linkage. See generally Bouchard et al., Who’s Leading Whom?, supra note 12;
Bouchard et al., Drug Approval-Drug Patenting, supra note 12; Sawicka &
Bouchard, supra note 12; Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 13.
218. See generally Final Report, supra note 22; Preliminary Report, supra
note 22.
219. See generally Faunce et al., supra note 165.
220. Id. at 2; Faunce & Lexchin, supra note 4, at 5.
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A similar comparison can be drawn from the differing
experiences of the United States, India, Australia, South
Korea, and Canada concerning allegations of evergreening
abuses. Compared to its American counterpart, the government
of Canada has been slow to respond to evergreening allegations
and has minimized the negative effects of linkage on patent
protection for blockbuster drugs in numerous internal studies
released between 2004 and 2010.221 By comparison, the
Supreme Court of India recently upheld the High Court of
Delhi’s rejection of pharmaceutical linkage, and the nation
clearly sees itself as a leader on the issues of global
pharmaceutical law and access to essential medication.222
Evergreening abuses have been addressed in a unique way in
this nation using traditional patent law: India’s ‘patent law
allows for filing of oppositions before the grant of a patent (pregrant opposition) which allows competitors (mostly generics) to
challenge the validity of a patent application before its grant.223
Indian companies have used pre-grant opposition to effectively
challenge some of the most profitable drugs, including Glivec,
Iressa, Tamiflu, and others.224
Why is Canada lagging behind the United States in its law
reform efforts? Why is South Korea going forward even though
its own data are projecting negative domestic impacts? Why
have some jurisdictions such as Australia and India responded
quickly and effectively to public interest concerns in bringing
in, amending, and/or rejecting their domestic linkage regimes
and what lessons are there for other jurisdictions?
One possible obstacle to effective policy-making and/or law

221. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
222. See Delhi High Court Rejects Bayer’s Appeal for Patent Linkage, EUR.
AIDS TREATMENT GROUP (Oct. 2, 2010), http://www.eatg.org/eatg/Global-HIVNews/Access-to-treatment/Delhi-High-Court-rejects-Bayer-s-appeal-forpatent-linkage.
223. FEROZ ALI KHADER, THE TOUCHSTONE EFFECT: THE IMPACT OF PREGRANT OPPOSITION ON PATENTS 39–40 (2008).
224. AstraZeneca’s Iressa Patent Application Rejected in India, INDIAN
PATENT
OPPOSITIONS
(Nov.
20,
2007,
11:05
PM),
http://indianpatentoppositions.blogspot.com/2007/11/astrazenecas-iressapatent-application.html; Varun R. Chhonkar, Indian Patent Office Rule
Against Gilead in Tamiflu PreGrant Opposition, PATENTCIRCLE (April 15,
2009),
http://patentcircle.blogspot.com/2009/04/indian-patent-office-ruledagainst.html; Joe C. Matthew, India Rejects Patent to Glivec’s Second Variant,
INDIA
ABROAD
(April
15,
2009),
REDIFF
http://www.rediff.com/money/2009/apr/15india-rejects-patent-to-glivecvariant.htm.
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reform is that linkage regulations are complex and not widely
understood. This is consistent with the observation in Bayer v.
India to the effect that there is no uniformity in the linkage
policy of different countries.225 Hence, there is great value in
comparative legal analysis of different linkage systems
worldwide.
A related and important issue is the manner in which
courts in different jurisdictions view the role of empirical data
in the context of an evolving legal landscape, particularly with
respect to technology-heavy areas of the law such as
intellectual property.226 A pertinent question that arises is how
should courts and law-makers react when empirical evidence
demonstrates that a particular piece of legislation is not
achieving its stated goals? Can such data support the
conclusion that the legislation is invalid or in need of
substantial amendment in order for it to remain intra vires?
Are there aspects of statutory interpretation in various
jurisdictions that illuminate an investigation into whether the
local linkage laws are meeting the stated goals of stimulating
the development of new and innovative drugs and facilitating
timely entry of generic drugs and if not what should be done
about it? An ancillary question is whether appellate courts in
different jurisdictions view law as “live” or “fixed”—and thus
more or less amenable to ex post empirical analysis.
There is some work to suggest that it may be useful to
investigate the vires of pharmaceutical linkage from a
purposive perspective, using ordinary language of linkage
statutes informed contextually by the scheme, purpose and
evidence of statutory intent.227 This approach supports an
important role for external context, referring to the interface
between original policy intent and the consequences of how
legislation works operationally in the real world.228 Taking an
225. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, LPA 443/2009, para. 32 (Delhi H.C.)
(India).
226. Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1579.
227. Purposive analysis of statutory text looks to the “material goals the
legislature hoped to achieve [and] the reasons underlying each feature of the
implementing scheme.” RUTH SULLIVAN, SULLIVAN AND DRIEDGER ON THE
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 204 (4th ed. 2004). Using evidence in
interpretation “can be helpful in understanding the meaning of legislative
language . . . [and] expos[ing] and dispel[ling] misconceptions that distort
interpretation.” Id. at 469.
228. See Hutchinson, supra note 46, at 33.
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“evidence-based” approach to the assessment of vires in a
technology-intensive sector such as pharmaceuticals resonates
particularly well with the state of global drug regulation, which
has clearly and strongly evolved toward “real world” or
evidence-based lifecycle models of drug approval for the last
two decades.229
If drug approval and drug patenting are becoming
increasingly evidence-based, there is no reason why the legal
linkage between the two should not do so as well. An evidencebased approach to vires is supported by the objective of
identifying the mischief a given piece of legislation was
intended to remedy at the time it was enacted.230 In the case of
linkage statutes or regulations, this exercise would likely be
contingent both on an understanding of the original policy
intent underpinning local linkage regimes as well as their
enabling statutes, typically patent legislation.231 When courts
are presented with competing interpretations of law (e.g.,
public health or economic; patent law or food and drug law), is
the clear choice one that accords substantively with a
legislative purpose that is consistent with an interpretation of
the statute as a workable whole?232 As noted by Fuller:
The troublesome cases are in reality resolved not in advance by the
legislator, but at the point of application . . . . All this adds up to the
conclusion that an important part of the statute in question is not
made by the legislator, but grows and develops as an implication of
complex practices and attitudes which may themselves be in a state of
development or change.233

In this view, the purpose of law is not static but rather a

229. Hans-Georg Eichler et al., Balancing Early Market Access to New
Drugs with the Need for Benefit/Risk Data: A Mounting Dilemma, 7 NATURE
REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 818, 823–24 (2008). For a discussion of the relevance
of lifecycle models to pharmaceutical linkage, see generally Sawicka &
Bouchard, supra note 12, at 109–15.
230. Hutchinson, supra note46, at 7 (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE Jr. ET
AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 226–27 (2nd ed. 2006)).
231. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby, supra note 5, at 107–09.
232. LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1968) [hereinafter Fuller
1968]; Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 667 (1957) [hereinafter Fuller 1957].
233. Fuller 1968, supra note 232, at 59. As noted by Hutchinson:
The process of interpreting statute is not just drawing out what
legislators put into it, but adjusting the statute to the implicit
demands and values of the society to which it is to be applied. In this
sense it may be said that no enacted law ever comes from its
legislator wholly and fully made.
Hutchinson, supra note 46, at 24 n.129 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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dynamic process of refining and clarifying means and ends
through a system of positive and negative feedback loops.234
The purposive analysis thus privileges evidence of how a law
operates in the lives of people affected by it, not theoretically or
hypothetically as an isolated idea or goal. In an analytical
framework of this nature, objective evidence of the operation of
statutes and regulations such as empirical evidence of
contextual operational efficiency is paramount.235
The notion that law is “alive” rather than stagnant draws
strong parallels to legal scholarship demonstrating law to be a
dynamic complex adaptive system.236 In such systems, law-inoperation is strongly contingent on evidence relating to positive
and negative feedback loops that impact on system
performance, including empirical data relating to systems of
intellectual property law and biomedical innovation.
V. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
Compared to the traditional patent system, pharmaceutical
linkage regulations represent a novel and evolving intellectual
property paradigm for pharmaceutical products. Even so, this
regime is rapidly evolving in a global context, and is poised to
become an important determinant of the availability and cost of
essential medications worldwide. In this Article, the authors,
representing a global network of scholars and practicing
lawyers, lay out a novel framework for a comparative legal
analysis of global pharmaceutical regulations.
A major goal we have identified is to investigate the
structural and functional aspects of global linkage regulations
as they relate to drug availability, costs, and expenditures on
the one hand and incentives for innovation and protection of
rights on the other. Structure-function analyses in the life
sciences have lead to numerous key insights into molecular,
cellular, tissue, organ, and whole body functioning over the last
half-century. In all of these areas of study, a key observation
has been that structure not only influences function, but
function also influences structure through an array of positive

234. See Hutchinson, supra note 46, at 24.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., J. B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex
Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of
Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 101, 109–29 (1997).
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and negative feedback loops.
This body of work in the medical sciences applies
fundamentally to law in two ways. First, because governments
have specific legal and policy goals in mind when drafting law
and regulations, and these goals are expressed in the form of
discrete legal and regulatory language. And second, because
the policy goals and statutory language referred to above are
reviewable by courts in judicial review and other proceedings.
In addition these goals and statutes may, and often are,
revisited by governments in the context of their law reform
efforts.
Here, we show that the structure-function paradigm can
also be a valuable tool for the study of law, particularly the
comparative analysis of the effects of different legislative and
regulatory tools on the pharmaceutical innovation ecology. In
particular, we demonstrate that differences in the discrete
statutory mechanisms underpinning pharmaceutical linkage in
different jurisdictions, and the way these mechanisms interact
with relevant provisions of patent and food and drug law, have
the potential to substantially alter outcomes and outputs in
relation to the balance of encouraging the development of new
and innovative drugs and facilitating timely generic entry.
A unique advantage of the structure-function methodology
proposed in this Article is that studying linkage in different
jurisdictions in this manner allows for both an investigation of
the structural and functional characteristics of local linkage
regimes with different initial starting conditions and different
legal mechanisms of operation and the identification of general
rules of linkage as the different national forms of linkage
interact and influence global pharmaceutical regulation. The
former provides a descriptive mechanism for assessing the
successes and failures of different regimes while the latter
provides a prescriptive approach for key decision makers to
revise, institute or abolish linkage regulations according to the
goals and objectives of differing nations.
The specific structural and functional aspects we discuss
here include, inter alia: assessment in each jurisdiction of the
original policy intent underpinning linkage; the specific legal
grounds underpinning linkage in various jurisdictions, in
particular the Bolar provision and how this provision interacts
with other policy levers intended to stimulate innovation while
also making generic drugs available faster; the manner in
which public health policy and economic policy is perceived by
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governments and the courts to converge or diverge through
linkage; the specific legal checks and balances designed
specifically to maintain balance between the interests of brand
and generic firms; the growing expansion of linkage beyond the
drug approval-drug patenting nexus to encompass drug pricing
and reimbursement; and the role of empirical studies to
establish the legal legitimacy of linkage regulations.
The goal of the work outlined here is to explicate the
different outputs and outcomes of pharmaceutical linkage in
different jurisdictions, and relate this understanding to among
other things fundamental differences in statutory language and
original policy intent in different jurisdictions. A further goal is
to assist key decision-makers in domestic and global
governments and legal systems working with linkage regimes
in their efforts to stimulate the production of new and
innovative drugs while at the same time facilitating timely
generic entry, lowering public health costs, and increasing
access to essential medicines.

